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An Analytical Survey
of Population
and Development
in Bangladesh
W. BRIAN ARTHUR
GEOFFREY MeN/COll
It is helpful at times to stand back
from a subject and try to pull together the various strands of knowledge
that have accumulated about it. This is our purpose in the present study
of population and development in Bangladesh. In writing this survey we
present more than a collection of facts and figures. Throughout, we are
concerned with analysis of the forces and realities behind the data, with
trying to make sense of the economic and demographic processes that lie
beneath Bangladesh's development problems.
We bring to the study no new evidence or data; rather, we marshal
existing knowledge as a base for analyzing population and development
issues and assessing development alternatives. Because of the sometimes
weak and fragmentary nature of this knowledge in the case of Bangla-
desh, the picture that emerges is in places blurred and speculative. But
it is consistent enough on the whole to allow us to draw some broad con-
clusions. A country study might be expected to forecast trends and offer
prescriptions for policy. Here we do neither. Our interest is more to locate
the particular economic, demographic, and social forces that seem likely
to influence the style of future development and set its bounds. Rather
than propose specific measures in a country where government has, at
best, a limited impact on local realities, we keep policy discussion at the
level of overall strategy.
Economic and demographic behavior is usually seen in either macro
or micro terms. National statistics are the outcome of decisions at the
individual level, and individual incentives in tum are set by aggregate
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conditions. Particularly in Bangladesh, however, we must seek much of
our understanding at a level between these extremes-in the details of
social organization and local institutions. We spend considerable time
discussing the Bangladesh situation at this intermediate level. It is here
that problems faced by government programs, prospects for rural change,
and present adverse patterns of demographic behavior can best be
explained.
We begin with a view of Bangladesh at the aggregate level, exanlin-
ing where the country stands and how it came to that position. In the
second and third sections we shift our focus to the local level, investigating
how social organization affects and is affected by the local economy, and
how these in tum influence individual incentives and demographic be-
havior. A final section assesses prospects and possibilities for future
development in Bangladesh.
The Bangladesh
Setting
The economic circumstances of Bangladesh are as familiar as they are
precarious. Per capita incomes are among the lowest in the world; less
than 15 percent of the adult population has had five or more years'
schooling; farm holdings are small and fragmented, with a growing pro-
portion (now perhaps a third) of rural households landless; the country
has not been self-sufficient in food for over two decades; nutritional
levels are believed to be inadequate for half the population. Demographic
conditions, too, are extreme. Crowded into a country a third the size of
California are some 85 million people; over 75 million of them live in the
countryside, making Bangladesh the most densely populated rural coun-
try in the world. Marriage takes place at a very young age and is all but
universal; total fertility, the average number of children born to a woman
surviving through her reproductive years, may be as much as seven; and
death rates are still high, though perhaps half the level of 25 years ago.
Even optimistically, the population growth rate cannot be lower than 2.5
percent per year, a level that would double the population in under 30
years.
What is interesting about this litany of grim statistics is not that life
in Bangladesh is at a bare subsistence level but that economic and demo-
graphic behavior worsening these conditions can persist in the face of
such circumstances and may indeed be fostered by them. In what follows
we investigate how and why this is so.
Colonial Past
For most of the last four centuries, as Bertocci (1976) has remarked, the
setting for Bangladesh's economic history has been "the control of East
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"
Bengal by structures of state power whose decision-making centers have
been outside the region." For some 200 years following Bengal's formal
incorporation in the Moghul empire in 1576, the region seemingly main-
tained a relative prosperity that, to judge from travelers' reports, dated
back to the middle ages. l Rice cultivation dominated then as it does
today, but a diversified agriculture and a successful local silk and cotton
industry were the basis of a vigorous export trade.
In the late eighteenth century, Moghul power was gradually yielded
to the British East India Company, with formal British administra-
tion following in 1857. Company dominance coincided with a rapid
decline in local industry, tracing the familiar pattern of colonial territories
in the Industrial Revolution but here hastened by a series of natural
disasters. From being a balanced agrarian economy the region was con-
verted into a raw-materials base for British industry. Local textile manu-
facturing virtually ceased in competition with machine-made yams and
fabrics, while specialization in export crops was emphasized-indigo and
safBower in the early 1800s, later jute and tea.:2 Under this deindustrializa-
tion, the population of the main commercial centers declined.3
Creation of Pakistan in 1947, accompanied by the violence and mas-
sive migrations of Partition, put an end to official colonial rule. But for
East Bengal (now East Pakistan), the new arrangements merely trans-
ferred power from Delhi to Karachi, creating in effect a new colonial
relationship that did little to aid development in the region. Jute milling,
previously concentrated around Calcutta and cut off in the Partition, was
reestablished in Dacca, but little else happened to fulfill the early promise
of economic progress. Pakistan's development program was ill suited to
the agrarian needs of its East Wing. Agriculture stagnated in the 195Os,
picking up only slowly in the 1960s with the first stirrings of the Green
Revolution. Output failed to stay abreast of population growth: Domestic
demand for rice began to shrink the area available for jute cultivation,
and even so, by the late 1960s East Pakistan was importing about 10
percent if its food requirements. By this time, when moves were finally
made to remedy some of the East-West inequities, it was too late to avert
civil war.
In 1971 the new nation of Bangladesh emerged, following a nine-
month struggle for independence that took as many as half a million lives,
displaced at least temporarily a tenth of the population, and saw the loss
of a significant part of the country's physical capital and managerial
talent:'
One continuing reality lay behind these changing regimes over the
two centuries preceding independence: Much of the region's agricultural
surplus was removed, leaving little available for investment within it.
Under the Company and the fonnal British administration, this was the
deliberate outcome of colonial policy, rationalized in the values of
empire. Bengal had a significant grain surplus, which the British managed
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to extract by tightening the loose procurement system they inherited from
the Moghuls. Under Pakistan in the 1950s a shrunken agricultural surplus
could still be removed, but now the mechanisms were different. Invest-
ment funds were allocated predominantly to promote industrial develop-
ment in Pakistan's West Wing, and the overvalued currency, maintained
so as to favor capital-goods imports, penalized the jute-export economy in
the East. This was largely the result of a strategy of industrialization
through import substitution, popular in the 1950s, that promoted industry
at the expense of agriculture. But in Pakistan the sectoral imbalance
typically created by such a strategy coincided with the country's East-
West division. Much of the value of the East's jute exports was in effect
transferred to the West. 5
With the steady removal of potential invesbnent resources under a
succession of colonial regimes, the region had little chance to develop its
economic base. Indeed, growth of the rural economy in the years from the
establishment of jute cultivation in the mid-nineteenth century through
the 1960s could well be described by the term that the Dutch economist
J. H. Boeke used of Java: static expansion. The economy steadily enlarged
itself, but its underlying structure remained the same. Bangladesh today
retains essentially the same economic base that had been established by
the 185Os: cultivation of rice, jute, and a few other crops, and export of
agricultural goods, mainly raw jute and manufactured jute products.
Even though total output is larger, so too is population, with the result
that the important qualitative indexes-crop yields, labor productivity, and
real incomes-have shown slight improvement or even have worsened over
the years.6
If Bangladesh was left little in the way of useful economic structure
from its colonial era, neither did it inherit a strong administrative frame-
work. Under the "Permanent Settlement" of 1793 the British created a de
facto landlord class, the zamindars, charged with collecting revenue. T
These in tum brought into being a multilayered hierarchy of tenants and
undertenants to squeeze revenue upward from the cultivator at the bot-
tom. Authority at the village level came to rest in the hands of these
middle men, supplanting an already weak system of village self-govern-
ment and acting in lieu of a formal administrative structure. It was a
system designed to extract surplus, which it did easily, though with
considerable leakage; but it left the British with minimal control or even
information below the level of the zamindars. Government reports in the
nineteenth century speak of "administrative starvation" in East Bengal,
a truncation of lines of administration even by the usual British colenial
pattern of indirect rule. This condition persisted despite a succession of
efforts to fill the institutional gap. 8 In the first decade of Pakistan rule
local government was again neglected. Only with the introduction in
1959 of the "Basic Democracies" system, which set up elected and ap-
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pointed councils at various administrative levels, did the outlines of a
fOlmal local government stmcture begin to take shape. But the realities
were disappointing. The national government's capacity to influence
events at the local level remains limited today.
In sum, then, Bangladesh inherited little from its colonial era that
could. be used as a basis for development. Two centuries of underinvest-
ment left an economy narrowly based, rural, and static. It also left a
legacy of underadministration, so that when there was finally a commit-
ment to rapid development, the national government had limited capa-
bility to promote needed changes at the village level. The main challenge
of creating an appropriate framework for national development has still to
be met.
Environmental
Conditions
Crucial to understanding much of what happens in Bangladesh are its
unique environmental circumstances.!l The country lies on the delta of
the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna rivers, an immense system of
tributaries and distributaries draining the central and eastern Himalayas
and the foothills of Assam. With the exception of the Chittagong Hill
Tracts adjoining the borders with India and Burma in the southeast and
some small areas in the northeast, most of the country is less than 15
meters above sea level. In normal years a third of the cultivated area is
one meter or more under water at the peak of the monsoon floods. The silt
deposited during this seasonal inundation maintains the high soil fertility,
making possible the extreme rural-population densities that characterize
the active delta areas (see Figure 1).
Siltation has another, less favorable effect, however. It steadily
raises the beds of the rivers and thus renders their courses unstable. There
are both short-run and long-mn consequences. In each monsoon some
banks are eaten away, while new land is built up elsewhere-sometimes
only to disappear again in a future season. Quite extensive land areas may
be involved in these year-to-year shifts, with a large impact on the ｬ ｯ ｣ ｡ ｾ
economy. Over the centuries there has been a steady eastward shift in
the active delta region, leaving major parts of the western districts (the
so-called moribund delta area) no longer flushed and renewed by the
annual flooding. This trend has been marked by spectacular shifts in
some of the main channels-most recently in the late 1700s and early
1800s, when the Brahmaputra changed course to form the Jamuna River
and the junction between the Ganges (Padma) and Meghna rivers was
first formed.
With a very dense population living under marginal geographic con-
ditions, it takes only slight changes to produce disasters. Shifting river
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courses are only one of the natural hazards facing Bangladesh. Variations
in the timing and amount of the monsoon rains can cause severe crop
damage and consequent local famine. With multiple cropping and the
contracted growing seasons of some of the new crop varieties, these
fluctuations become even more ｾ ｲ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ Ｎ Along the southern coast in the
tidal areas, salinity poses a constant threat to agriculture. Cyclones are
common in the Bay of Bengal and have accounted for much loss of life
over the years through excessive flooding. The tidal waves (bores) that
sometimes accompany them have been a major cause of destruction on
the islands in the delta mouth. Table 1 cpmts the worst of the natural
disasters over the last two centuries, together with the man-made calami-
ties of more recent years.
Table 1
Major Disasten in Bangladesh
in the last 200 Yean
1784-88 Floods and famine;
radical shift in course
of Brahmaputra (1787)
1873-74 Famine
1876 Bakarganj Cyclone and
tidal wave
1884-85 Famine
1897 Chittagong Cyclone
1918-19 Influenza epidemic
1943 Bengal Famine
1947 Partition of India
1970 Cyclone and tidal wave
1971 VVarofindependence
1974 Famine
Year
1769-76
Event
Great Bengal Famine
Casualties
"Eliminated almost a third of Bengal's
population" (A. Ahmed, 1962, p. 140),
although impact was less severe in East
Bengal (N. Ahmad, 1968, p. 327)
Unknown (N. Ahmad, 1968, pp. 33, 101)
Unknown (A. Ahmed, 1962, p. 141)
c. 400,000 deaths (N. Ahmad, 1968, p. 51)
Unknown (Bhatia, 1967, p. 164)
c. 175,000 deaths (N. Ahmad, 1968, p.51)
c. 400,000 deaths (M. R. Khan, 1972b,
p.384)
2-2.5 million deaths (A. Ahmed, 1962,
p. 141; M. R. Khan, 1972b, p. 384)
Unknown; total deaths in Partition
c. one million, but most were in VVest
(Davis, 1951, p. 197)
200,000-500,000 deaths (L. C. Chen, 1973)
c. 500,000 deaths (Curlin, Chen, and
Hussain, 1976, p. 31)
Officially c. 30,000 deaths (Majlis, 1977),
although some estimates are much higher
(e.g., 500,000 - Baldwin, 1977; 80,000 in
Rangpur district alone - Haque et aI.,
1977)
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Environmental circumstances-in particular, duration and depth of
Hooding-largely dictate agricultural possibilities. They govern where
double cropping is feasible, where paddy can be transplanted rather than
broadcast, and where short-stemmed varieties rather than deep-water
Hoating rice can be grown-all factors that greatly affect land produc-
tivity. In the delta areas that are Hooded no more than a meter or so, two
rice crops are typically possible: one ("autumn rice") harvested early in
the monsoon, the other ("winter rice") transplanted after the floods begin
to recede. Jute competes with the fonner crop. In more heavily inundated
areas, only a single crop can be grown: either floating rice, able to keep
abreast of rising floodwaters to a depth of 5 or 6 meters, or, where Hood-
ing is even deeper, dry-season "summer rice." A single rice crop is also all
that is possible in the areas of decaying rivers and poor drainage in the
western and northwestern districts, where long fallow periods have
traditionally been required. Finally, in the hills near the eastern borders
shifting cultivation is still practiced.1o
Agriculture would be less tied to local conditions if modern water
control were more widely available. Mastery of the environment is still at
a relatively primitive level, however. The hazards of minor year-to-year
variations in weather patterns and seasonal Hooding can be countered by
individual or community effort-building mounds and levees, drilling
wells, digging and dredging irrigation channels, elevating cowsheds on
bamboo stilts, and so on. But the population is nearly defenseless against
the recurrent larger vagaries of wind and water. Real mastery of the delta
would call for interventions of a much larger magnitude. As yet, however,
few large-scale projects have been undertaken. I I Ironically, the largest
effort in the region to modify environmental conditions, the recently com-
pleted Farakka Barrage, dams the Ganges just on the Indian side of the
border and has the potential to seriously injure the agricultural ecology
of western Bangladesh.12
Settlement
and Survival
We turn next to the human ecology of Bangladesh. The region's demo-
graphic history parallels that of the subcontinent as a whole.13 The
recorded part of this history spans barely a century, from the first census
covering Bengal in 1872. Already at that time there were 23 million
people counted in the area that is now Bangladesh. Up to about the mid·
1920s the story is one of slow population growth against environmental
and technological constraints, interrupted by large-scale setbacks.14 After
that, mortality receded more or less steadily, a decline halted only by the
Bengal Famine of 1943 and the disturbances of Paltition. As a result
population growth accelerated sharply: In the 1930s for the first time it
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exceeded 1 percent annually over a decade, and recently it has reached
2.6 percent per year.
The mortality decline over the last 50 years has reduced the death
rate from above 40 per thousand to a level of about 20.15 Various factors
have contributed to this drop, their relative weights not fully agreed
upon: fewer famine-related deaths as transport and communication sys-
tems developed and government relief measures became more effective,16
some improvements in public health, the introduction of specific treat-
ments for epidemic diseases, and lessened virulence of some of the
diseases themselves (notably plague). In cause of death, the most im-
portant declines have probably been in the incidence of smallpox,
cholera, and malaria-the first now eliminated, the others substantially
under control (although malaria shows some indication of resurgence).1T
But in spite of these improvements, the mortality level is still high by con-
temporary standards, even among developing countries.
There has been no comparable secular trend in fertility. Recent
estimates mostly put the birth rate in the range of 45 to 50 per thousand,
a rate probably not much lower than a century ago.1S Migration has been
sporadic, with a large net exodus at the time of Partition and again in
1971, but on average has little impact on population growth.1!) An esti-
mated population trajectory and a possible sequence of crude birth rates
for Bangladesh over the last century, based on official (Bureau of Statistics)
data, are sketched in Figure 2. The detailed pattern may be debatable,
but there is little doubt that the broad features shown are correct.
When we look more closely at the demographic picture, we see popu-
lation growth linked tightly to local environmental conditions. Two pro-
cesses are at work. First, wherever new technology or resources appear,
settlement expands to take advantage of them. Population growth, as it
were, follows the contours of local economic opportunity. Second, the
pressures and momentum of continued population growth sooner or later
exhaust whatever "slacks" these opportunities provide; people are forced
to seek and exploit whatever other local means of subsistence they can
find.
The first process can be seen in the expansion of the jute industry in
the late nineteenth century. Jute cultivation, concentrated in the central,
annually flushed part of the delta, created an income that could finance
rice purchases from the western districts and later from abroad. Census
figures since 1872 record slow but steady population growth in this core
area, whereas the rest of the country showed comparatively little
change.2o Migrants flowed in, attracted by the small but sustained
regional surplus; and the marginal improvement in the local economy
may also have lowered mortality.
Similarly, the beginnings of significant technological change in agri-
culture in the last 10 to 15 years present another kind of oppoltunity.
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Figure 2
Outline of Population and Vital Rates,
Bangladesh, 1872-1974
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With the increased use of irrigation and chemical fertilizers in the past
decade, high-yielding, fertilizer-responsive rice varieties have been re-
placing traditional varieties, particularly in the districts along the western
border (Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Kushtia, and Jessore ). These areas recorded
relatively high growth rates in the 1961-74 intercensal period. 21
Even small-scale opportunities attract population. People are quick
to settle on the char lands in the delta mouth-land that appears and as
quickly can disappear with the shifting patterns of siltation.
OppOltunities do not come along in a steady stream, however, and
as population growth continues in any locality, the slacks they create are
W. Brian Arthur / Geaffrey McNicoll 33
progressively exhausted. But the demographic processes at work do not
. reverse at that point. Fertility does not adjust downward, nor does
mortality easily rise again. Migrants once settled tend to stay. The result
is a downward pressure on standards of subsistence as demographic
inertia presses growing numbers against the limits of productive possibili-
ties. Thus we see cultivated land expanded to its fullest extent, with sig-
nificant areas that are in production lying in extremely hazardous zones.
Fishing, too, is heavily exploited in inland waters, though less so in the
Bay of Bengal. The influx of destitute villagers into the cities-some just
for ShOlt periods until rural conditions improve again, others with nothing
to go back to- is another manifestation of this Ricardian process of increas-
ing marginality.
Thus, not only does population settlement follow environmental op-
portunities, but the inbuilt inertia of demographic processes exhausts
these over the years and pushes environmental limitations as far as they
will stretch. But limitations reached in the short telm may not hold up
over a longer time. Overexploitation can set into motion long-run forces
of ecological degradation that are difficult to reverse. An important past
instance was the building of embankments, where local safety from
flooding was often bought at the cost of accelerating river decay over
the long tenn. More recently, population growth in the largest remaining
forest area of Bangladesh, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, has been shortening
the fallow periods in shifting cultivation, leading in tum to serious soil
erosion. And the current technological improvements in agriculture, en-
tailing large" applications of fertilizer and pesticides and greater crop
specialization, may very well have their own adverse effects on the delta
ecology, as yet barely visible. 2 :!
Independence
and After
With political independence barely seven years old. where does the coun-
try now stand and what are its economic prospects?
The first years of independence were difficult. Bad harvests in 1972-
73 were followed by damaging floods in the summer of 1974. International
tenns of trade worsened considerably: Prices of foodgrains, petroleum,
fertilizer. and cement rose sharply, while jute stagnated. Inflation. falling
real wages, labor unrest, and political instability added to the troubles.23
Two years of good harvests and stable government put the initial setbacks
into a better perspective. But even allowing that it takes time for a new
country to get proper control of its economy, it is clear that Bangladesh
faces difficult problems in the period ahead.
What is the outlook for the industrial sector? The country has sizable
reserves of natural gas, with exploration still at an early stage (and barely
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begun offshore). The largest presently known field (Bakhrabad, dis-
covered in 1968) may alone justify construction of a liquification plant.
If so, liquified natural gas could rapidly become Bangladesh's second
largest source of export earnings, with the possibility before long of
overtaking jute. Natural gas can also support a fertilizer industry, produc-
ing for both domestic use and export. A growing domestic market may
stimulate production of a wide range of consumer goods and some items
of capital equipment (agricultural implements, pumps, and so on), and
improving relations with Pakistan may reopen that market for "soft" man-
ufactures. Perhaps even assembly plants for reexports on the South
Korea-Taiwan model might be developed, although this seems unlikely
to occur on a scale large enough to have more than a minor impact. 24
In the agricultural sector, hopes rest on the new high-yielding crop
varieties and their accompanying technology-in particular, better water
control. As is often remarked, rice yields in Bangladesh are only a third
of Japan's (although they are in line with those of India and most of
Southeast Asia). A World Bank analysis undertaken in 1911 concluded
that with presently known techniques, together with adequate supplies
of fertilizer and other inputs and proper irrigation and drainage, rice
production could be quadlUpled by the end of the century. Even with-
out costly, large-scale water control projects (i.e., by relying chiefly on
tubewells and low-lift pumps), a trebling of output was considered
feasible. 25 But between these possibilities and today's realities stand
major obstacles. First, it is doubtful whether the new technology will be
adopted under circumstances at all close to optimal. Not only must inputs
be correctly combined with fairly precise timing over the crop cycle, but
the technology requires a degree of local infrastructure-credit, extension
services, distribution, cooperative water arrangements-not easily put
together under present social arrangements. Second, many traditional
crops, such as jute and floating rice, have as yet no high-yielding counter-
part. Yield increases have occurred mostly in areas that grow the rela-
tively small "summer rice" crop. Third, diffusion of the new technology
cannot go faster than the speed with which pumps, fertilizer, and other
inputs become available. Not surprisingly, then, although high-yielding
varieties have been adopted rapidly in some districts over the past decade,
results on a national level have so far been disappointing.26 Writing in
1975, Noazesh Ahmed (1976, p. 19) concluded that "irrigation facilities
and the input package programmes so far extended have had little effect
on the national production of rice. The higher rice production in the
country still depends mostly on good weather conditions."
In this brief account we have seen that Bangladesh at independence
inherited a largely static and traditional rural economy with a small in-
dustrial base. A densely settled population, growing rapidly over the last
few decades, meshes tightly with a hazardous natural environment. The
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local administrative system is weak, limiting the national govemment's
ability to influence events at the local level. Important opportunities for
industrial growth exist, but because of the economic dominance of agri-
culture, any hope of rapid change necessarily rests on progress in the
rural sector. Here we have a recognized technological path to follow,
although one that has severe obstacles along the way.
The Local Context
of Development
Underlying the rural economy and governing much of its performance
is a complex local social system. In this section, we ask how this system
works and how it is supported, and examine the ways in which it pro-
motes or impedes various kinds of social change. In shifting our focus
from the national to the local level, we are led into territory equally un-
familiar to the demographer and the development planner, but an area in
which both the economic and demographic future of Bangladesh is likely
to be decided.
Dynamics
of Landholding
Local organization in rural Bangladesh is closely tied to the ownership of
land. Land, in a country with few other productive assets, bestows status,
power, and above all security. Although in good years income from wage
labor can support a family, over longer periods, with a saturated labor
market, it is a poor guarantee. Only ownership of land, or usage rights to
it, prOvide a long-run sureness of access to the local social product. Not
surprisingly, then, wealth and social standing in lUral Bangladesh are
measured in terms of landholding. 27
With virtually no farms that are large in absolute terms, small varia-
tions in landholding can lead to marked differences in social class. Divi-
sions are somewhat arbitrary, but we might distinguish four classes of
agricultural families. 28 Those who control about 3 hectares or more con-
stitute the rural elite-5 percent of families with roughly 20 percent of
the agricultural land. These are the landlords and the surplus peasants.
Beneath them are the middle peasants, those with about 1 to 3 hectares-
roughly 25 percent of families in agriculture. Many of these are both
landowners and tenants. Next in standing are marginal peasants with less
than 1 hectare, including the poorest tenant farmers and sharecroppers.
Finally, at the bottom of the scale are landless agricultural workers,
forced to rely on agricultural wage labor and whatever other sources of
income they can find. These last two categories cover more than two-
thirds of the agricultural population. Subsistence for them in all but the
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best of times depends on relations with the larger landowners to help
them secure wage employment.
Declining landholding lies behind much of the present rural im-
poverishment. The actual dynamics of landownership are complicated,
but the main processes are closely tied to population growth and are
worth looking at in some detail.
If population were stationary, land could be turned over from father
to son in a fairly constant pattern over the generations. Where popula-
tion is growing rapidly, as in Bangladesh, patterns must change, and
there are a limited number of possibilities for accommodation: more
land brought under cultivation; more falms on land already in use; more
people on existing farms; or more people landless. Each of these options
appears to have been taken in Bangladesh.
Historical data on landholding are hard to come by, but it appears
that in the early part of the century the growing population was accom-
modated by expansion of cultivated land and by an increase in the
number of fanns (as land was increasingly subdivided by inheritance).
In the last 20 to 30 years these two possibilities have largely been ex-
hausted. By the early 1950s expansion of cultivated land had virtually
ceased; and as fann sizes grew smaller through constant division, hold-
ings were increasingly pushed below subsistence level-the size needed
to support a family's consumption.29 A limit to the multiplication of
smaller and smaller farms was in effect reached. ｂ ･ ｬ ｾ ｷ a certain subsist-
ence size, families were likely to fall into debt in a poor season, entering a
downward spiral that frequently ended with the loss of their holdings to the
more affluent. Population growth, no longer able to be accommodated on
increasing numbers of smaller fanns, added instead to the landless and
to the numbers per fann.
The figu!es bear out this sequence. As Table 2 indicates, numbers of
smaller fanns have not increased in the last 20 years; in fact, the size dis-
tribution has been ahnost constant.30 Landlessness, on the other hand,
has greatly increased. The trend is strikingly evident in recent surveys,
which show the landless agricultural population growing from about 15
to 20 percent in the early 1960s to between 30 and 35 percent a decade
later.31 Simultaneously, the average numbers per fann have risen as well.
During the 1961-74 intercensal period, the increase in the agricultural
labor force was roughly 5 million and that of landless agricultural workers
perhaps 3.5 to 4 million, leaving more than a million workers, together with
their dependents, added to the population on existing fanns. 32
The implications of these processes are several. Obviously, faced by
the prospect of losing land, individual families have less security. The
threat of landlessness hangs over the great majority of landholding fami-
lies. Purchasing land or holding on to what one has becomes an overrid-
ing concern.
W. Brian Arthur / Geoffrey McNicoll 37
Also, the increasing numbers of people per fann create pressure to
seek other sources of income. Detailed studies of individual fann families
reveal an astonishing range of income-generating activities in addition to
fanning. One analysis of a village economy in a national-income format
found less than half of village income attributable to cultivation, and
only two-thirds to all of agriculture.a3 For the poorer peasants petty trad-
ing, fishing, and handicrafts can supplement wage labor. The better-off
are often active in such small businesses as marketing agricultural prod-
ucts, distributing inputs, and moneylending.34
Table 2
Distribution of Farm Area
by Number and Size of Farms (Operational Holdings),
Bangladesh, 1960, 1968, and 1974
Percent of Farms Percent of Farm Area Operated
Ranked by Size
(Quintiles) 1960 1968 1974
ｆｩｾｴ (bottom 20% of farms) 2.3 3.0 1.6
Second 8.4 8.3 3.4
Third 14.3 13.3 14.4
Fourth 21.8 22.4 25.6
Fifth (top 20% of farms) 53.2 53.0 55.0
SOURCE: Alamgir (1975), p. 268. Data compiled from 1960 Agricultural Census, 1968
Master Survey of Agriculture, and village surveys taken in 1974 by Bangladesh Institute
of Development Studies.
As a further consequence, growing numbers of landless put an
increasing pressure on the already strained labor market. We noted
earlier that real wages have fallen substantially in recent years. This
trend could be ameliorated somewhat by the new agricultural technology,
which is modestly labor absorbing, but offsetting this hope is the growth
of the farm population itself. Farmers are more likely to employ their
own family members before they hire others.ali Finally, as people are
pushed off farms, out of ownership into wage labor, agriculture is slowly
becoming commercialized. Small-scale peasant ownership and localized
labor markets are giving way to an economy based on impersonal em-
ployer-employee relationships, a primary source of change we will look
at shortly.a8
Social Organization
in a Changing Society
The preceding picture of a skewed distribution of access to the rural
economy is a major part of the Bangladesh reality. But access is not so
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simply determined. As in any traditional society, ties of kinship, patron-
age, and neighborhood may cut across landholding, serving to strengthen
or weaken an individual's claim on the social product and to modify his
sense of risk or security.
The pattern of rural social organization at the local level is intricate.
People scattered through various horizontal layers of landholding classes
are bound together, sometimes strongly, sometimes casually, into group-
ings of several different kinds. Table 3 gives a schematic summa.ry of the
more important of these, achieving comparative simplicity of description
at the cost of blurring many fine distinctions and ignoring local varia-
tions. 3 7 Besides those groupings mentioned, there are divisions along
religious lines (the Hindu minority is separate in many respects), by
occupation (the residue of caste, with modem status rankings super-
imposed), and by length of residence in a particular locality. It is suffi-
cient here, however, to pick out the more poweIful organizing forces.
Kinship ties at several levels enmesh individuals in a. range of obli-
gations and in tum help to distribute the burden of risk. The nuclear or
patrilineally extended family is the basic social and economic unit of
Bangladesh society. Beyond his immediate household, a person has well-
defined duties to his bari (homestead) and somewhat weaker ties to
larger, kin-based groups (paribar and gusthi ). For example, the bari
often operates as a corporate entity with land held in the name of its
head, who exercises patriarchal control over members.38 Paribar and
gusthi tend to dominate in such matters as selection of spouse and nego-
tiation of dowry or bride-price, the upbringing of children, and disposal
of assets. These extended family and lineage groups have more signifi-
cance among the bigger landowners. For families with no land or only a
house compound, there is little economic rationale for emphasizing rela-
tions with close but equally impoverished kin.
For families with a tenuous place in the economy, alliances with
leading surplus fanners in patronage groupings (shamai, reyai) have
much to offer. In exchange for allegiance the small landholder or landless
worker may receive preferential employment, some support in bad years,
seasonal credit, and other benefits. The leader in turn obtains a following
to support him in local elections and disputes and, obviously, a sense of
importance. The nucleus of a patronage group consists of the leader and
his close relatives; wider membership typically comes from adjacent
households within the village. (A village may contain several such
groups.) The functions of patronage groups vary somewhat district by
district. In some they are purely political; in others quasi-official func-
tions-part ceremonial, part judicial-are also present. Membership may
change over time, and not all families necessarily belong to any group of
this sort. In at least some villages there are also informal factional divi-
sions separate from shamaj groupings (or occasionally within them).
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These factions (dal), often at odds with each other, have a more fluid,
even shadowy presence that is not openly discussed with outsiders, but
may form an important part of local political reality. 39
Natural villages or hamlets, the basis of rural settlement and local
allegiance in much of Asia, are weak in Bangladesh-a fact that has im-
portant consequences for development. The natural village (gram )is
socially defined, and residents have a clear perception of its territorial
boundaries; but these units tend to have no corporate features, little
cohesive identity, and only a residual degree of solidarity.40 One writer
has observed: "A man's duties are, in order, to his own family (bari),
then toward his paribar, then to his gusthi and then to his village."41
Settlement patterns are partly responsible: In land subject to extensive
seasonal flooding, small groups of homesteads are clustered on raised
ground (often mounds or levees) built up from surrounding flood plains;
hence, dispersed or linear settlements rather than nucleated villages are
the rule. 42 But the relative lack of function of villages in the society can
also be traced to the colonial failure to provide effective local adminis-
tration. As a consequence, village life is segmented. A man may reside
in one village, attend a mosque in another, patronize a market in a third,
and cultivate plots of land in any or all of them. For adjudication of
minor disputes he may calIon the head of his gusthi or on the leader of
the shamaj to which he belongs; for assistance in ploughing or harvesting
he may turn to other members of his paribar or to wage labor from dis-
tant villages.
Territoriality is not completely missing from Bangladesh social orga-
nization, however. The subvillage neighborhood cluster, the para, is
sometimes a cohesive social unit, although it has little explicit role at
present. And as we have seen, patronage groupings also have a kind of
territorial basis, albeit a fluid one. But for the most part, functions usually
ascribed to the village community in peasant society are filled in rural
Bangladesh by a variety of nonresidential and overlapping groups with
more or less specialized concerns-religious, political, economic, and so on.
From this brief description, kinship and patronage ties stand out as
the most powerful organizing forces in rural society. These two traditional
forces together characterize the local system. They act as a simple, non-
market distributive mechanism, channeling access and security down-
ward; and, by binding together people of various social levels, they have
tended to diffuse any strong manifestation of class. They have given the
system a high measure of stability.
Under the twin pressures of population growth and increasing com-
mercialization, there are signs that both kinship and patronage bonds
are weakening. 43 As population grows, the kinship-patronage distribu-
tional system may become overloaded: Assets are diluted through the
subdivision of land, supporters' needs grow, and numbers of people on the
Table"
Elements of Rural Social
Organization in Bangladesh
Grouping
chula, khana, ghar
(household)
bari (homestead)
paribar (lineage)
gusthi (clan, kin group)
Oescription and Basis
of Affiliation
Nuclear or joint
family
Extended family com-
prising several nuclear
or joint households
sharing a home
compound
Group of baris whose
members are agnatically
related; would rarely
overlap a village
Kin based, but more
inclusive than paribar;
sometimes extends beyond
Village boundary
Approximate Average
Size or Size Range
5-6 persons
4-6 households
(20-30 persons)
50-150 persons
Wide range of
sizes
Major
Functions
Main productive and
-reproductive unit,
but often operates as
clement of bari or
paribar
May operate as
economic unit
Has wide-ranging
control over members'
behavior (e.g., mar-
riage, disposition of
property)
Control functions are
similar to paribar;
heads of constituent
paribars may act as
informal local
leadership
Assessment of
Strength or Cohesion
Strong
Typically strong and
coheSive
Strong
Often strong
Table 3 (continued)
Grouping
Description and Basis
of Affiliation
Approximate Average
Size or Size Range
Major
Functions
Assessment of
Strength or Cohesion
---------------------------------
para, kandi
(neighborhood group)
gram (local village,
hamlet)
milat (mosque
congregation)
shamai, reyai
(patronage group)
Clusters of adjacent
homesteads or households
within a village; members
likely to be all of one
religion
Socially defined village;
often not coinciding with
the administrativeiy
recognized unit
Group defined by attend-
ance at same mosque;
often drawn from more
than one village
Defined chiefly by patron-
client bonds, usually cen-
tering around a dominant
leader or line.lge group;
typically members live
adjacently
100-200 persons
c. 100 households
(400-800 persons)
Wide rang,
Wide range of sizes,
from a few households
to an entire village;
membership well
defined but fairly
fluid
NU/Il:
few and residual;
rarely has any
corporate features
Chiefly ritual and
ceremonial
Mobilization of
political resources;
interfacing with
government adminis-
trative and distribu-
tive structures
Moderately weak, unless
coinciding with a shamaj
or lineage group
Weak
Weak
Often strong
---_._----------------------
SOURCES: See note 37.
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surplus fanns rise. Fonner clients must be abandoned, left to attach
themselves to the fonnal wage system. And growing commercialization,
reflecting the new values and opportunities associated with technological
change and increased urban contact, is beginning to transfonn an econ-
omy based on personal relations into one that is fonnalized and mone-
tized. This process, which might be seen as a healthy sign of moderniza-
tion in many countries, is a mixed blessing in Bangladesh. Fanners find
outlets other than traditional power maintenance for their surplus: invest-
ment in nonagricultural enterprise or in education, new consumer goods,
and so on. Increasingly, there are signs that large landowners are reluc-
tant to let to their kin; sharecropping is giving way to pure tenancy; and,
as noted earlier, patron-client bonds are being supplanted by an em-
ployer--employee relationship. Market forces that pennit the wealthier
peasants to shake free from their fonner obligations tend to erode what
little security the landless and near landless now possess. More people
in these latter classes are compelled to be geographically mobile, respond-
ing to seasonal labor demands and in turn depressing local wage rates.H
Although traditional patronage and kin ties probably still dominate rural
relations in most of the country (systematic infonnatlon on the pace and
extent of change is lacking), the directions and impetus for movement
toward a more fonnalized, impersonal economy are clearly evident.45
Our overall impression of rural social organization in Bangladesh,
then, is one of diffuseness. Duties and obligations run in various direc-
tions, and functions are split among different kinds of social groupings.
Local society is fragmented into groups organized around leading fami-
lies, which are often at odds' with one another. No strong territorial
groupings exist to pull community interests into line. This traditional
structure is changing slowly, increasingly coming to be based on fonnal
commercial relations, but this process is still in its early stages. We turn
now to the implications of this local system for rural development.
The Politics of Local Change
We have looked briefly at the patterns of economic and social organiza-
tion in rural Bangladesh. How do these relations set the context of rural
development-defining command over resources, limiting the scope of
individual action, and promoting or hindering economic progress?
Agriculture in Bangladesh, as we have seen, has yet to show the
dramatic improvements that the new technology can potentially offer.
Yields are still low, and government attempts to foster change have met
with mixed success. Certainly such problems are by no means unique,
but in Bangladesh two special circumstances worsen matters: the general
social diffuseness just described and the absence of the kind of local ad-
ministrative system that could prOvide a finn institutional setting for
development.
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Social diffuseness-the lack of community integration and purpose we
noted earlier-would be less of a problem if peasant fanning were carried
out on an individual basis. But the new agricultural technology makes
greater demands than before on organization and cooperation, both of
which are weak in rural Bangladesh. Village society was seen as cut
across by various social groupings, often in conflict. In the case of
rival factions, competition can be outrightly violent. Bertocci (1970) has
drawn a striking and disturbing parallel between the emergence and
potency of factional groupings in Bangladesh society and the situation in
Sicily that led to the growth of the Mafia. Vertical relations can also
involve violence and intimidation: A recent series of village studies by
Shapan Adnan presents a stark picture of this aspect of village life. 46 This
atmosphere of competition and conflict not only provides an insecure
setting for individual initiative, but also ensures that the benefits of devel-
opment go mostly to the powerful. Distribution of fertilizer and control
of irrigation are often cornered by a dominant family or factional group,
to the detriment of the rest of the community.
The problem here, of course, is not that Bangladesh villagers are
inherently unable to cooperate-many efforts to fonn rural cooperatives
have been quite successful-but rather that, without strong outside sup-
port, traditional social and economic segmentation eventually blocks
collaborative effort. In some societies, territorial bonds supply a sufficient
measure of community responsibility to avoid such an outcome, but in
Bangladesh, as we have seen, territorial affiliation is weak.
H traditional social arrangements impede agricultural development,
the local administrative system imposed on them does little to help
matters. In Bangladesh, as we noted earlier, the various colonial regimes
did not leave behind a strong system of local government capable of
responding to national goals and providing a finn institutional setting for
rural change. And more recent attempts to fill this gap have merely
strengthened the existing obstacles. The basic unit in the regional adminis-
trative hierarchy is the union, corresponding to about 15 census villages on
average, with a population of 15,000 to 20,OOO.4i Unions are governed by
elected councils, which have broad authority for local welfare and power
to levy land taxes. When these councils were instituted under universal
adult franchise in 1959, most members, not surprisingly, came from the
rural elite-the larger surplus fanners and the leaders of dominant line-
ages or patronage groups.48 Council membership and, in particular, the
chainnanship were major new sources of local power and patronage. To
the extent it had wished to do so, the national government in reaching
downward through the administrative hierarchy failed to gain a purchase
at the union level. Far from introdUcing a territorially based structure at
odds with traditional village power relations, the administrative system
at its lowest level became effectively an instrument of those relations.
As a result of this capture of the local system by the rural elite, their
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interests, not those of the average fanner or those proclaimed by the
national government, continued to dominate the rural scene. Under the
traditional social system these interests had little to do with agricultural
innovation. For the rural well-off, lending money at high interest rates
(often more than 100 percent), buying up mortgaged land, and building
the strength of followers provided faster routes to position and status than
painstaking investment in agriculture.40
H attempts to create an effective administrative structure indepen-
dent of the local elite thus foundered, most government programs to
directly promote rural development have met a similar fate. The best
known case is the history of the cooperative schemes set up by the Bang-
ladesh Academy for Rural Development (the Comilla cooperatives) .liO
In their own tenns, these cooperatives had substantial early success in
organizing small and middle peasants and in providing members with
seed, fertilizer, credit, and so on. But Over time, and especially with the
attempted countrywide replication as the Integrated Rural Development
Programme, most cooperatives came to be dominated by the rich fanners
who could get themselves elected to the managing committees. (The
process is of course familiar in cooperative movements in many coun-
tries.) These rich farmers were able to monopolize inputs, re-Iend cheap
government loans to others at higher rates, and control irrigation groups
to the benefit of themselves and their supporters. The original intent of
the scheme, to mobilize and assist the small fanner, was achieved only
briefly. Programs that have sought to benefit the poorest rural classes-
the Rural Public Works Programme and various other food-for-work
schemes-seem to have been less open to direct capture. But if these
efforts had been on a scale to make a significant impact on rural employ-
ment or distribution, we would expect that before long they also would
have confonned to local political and administrative realities. 51
In short, the segmented social order that characterizes rural Bangla-
desh, while it perfonns some useful functions, works to obstruct collective
agricultural interests at the village level. Government attempts to impose
outside organization and direction have for the most part been taken over
by traditional forces, which have diverted them to their own ends.
As local society becomes more commercialized, these politics of rural
development are likely to change. Rural power, traditionally derived from
lineage rights and more recently from local government authority, is now
shifting to an economic base. Increasingly, those who can capture a dis-
proportionate share of the new technology and its supporting infrastruc-
ture become the new rural elite. Under capitalist agriculture the landlords,
as Wood (1976, p. 149) puts it, "exchange the benefits of a respected
leadership position for those based on the more naked reality of economic
power." It is possible, of course, that this new economic basis of society
will transfonn traditional patronage leaders into a class of well-behaved
petty capitalists anxious to invest in rural growth. But if the new elite
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does begin to invest heavily in high-yielding technology, there is a danger
that this could result in a speeding up of land transfer and a further con-
centration of resources, with negative consequences for the spread of
benefits to the lower levels of society. Instead of being a powedul force
in the modernizing of society, high-yielding agriculture could well be-
come little more than the new instrument by which a rural elite main-
tains its traditional position. ｾ Ｒ
This picture of local society would not be complete without mention
of the urban scene in Bangladesh. Cities presently have little weight in
the overall economic and social structure, containing less than 10 percent
of the population. Dacca (1974 population 1.7 million), Chittagong
(900,000), Khulna (400,000), and Narayanganj (270,000, but essentially
part of the Dacca metropolitan area) are the only major centers. ｾ Ｓ But
with this small base it takes only a slight rural-urban drift to induce rapid
urban growth. These four cities nearly trebled in size between 1961 and
1974-an annual rate of increase of 8 percent, or more than three times
the growth rate of the rural population. Yet even at such a growth rate
urban areas are absorbing less than a fifth of the rural natural increase
each year.
New arrivals in the cities come from the full range of rural society.
For some migrants, mostly from the rural elite, the cities are openings to
an urban middle class, offering education and the prospect of jobs in
government or the private sector. For the less well-off, this small modem
sector supports considerable lower-status employment, ranging from wage
labor in manufacturing and construction to fringe activity in small-scale
commerce and services. And in bad seasons, such as that of 1974, the cities
also become the last refuge of the rural destitute.
The recency of significant urbanization in Bangladesh means that it
is too early to assess the nature of the society that is evolving. Almost by
definition urban behavior is less inlluenced by family and kinship ties,
whether because of emerging middle-class attitudes or because of the
imperatives of day-to-day subsistence. But new social groupings appear.
The poor now tend to be residentially separated, often in squatter settle-
ments (Dacca was estimated to have 400,000 squatters in ＱＹＷＲｾＴＩＬ and
awareness of their common interests leads to some community solidarity.
Young people, particularly students, become a distinctive social group and
sometimes, as in the events leading up to the 1971 war, a political force.
And factory workers and even government employees are mobilized in
labor unions. Administratively, a sometimes tenuous stability is main-
tained with help from a visible military and police presence.
To summarize this account of the local context of development, we
see access to land and distribution of security as the important traditional
organizing forces in the rural economy and society. But both are
threatened as landlessness increases through rapid population growth.
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Agricultural change is impeded by a social system that allows develop-
ment initiatives to be captured by the better-off, and social cohesion is
fragile and exclusive, making it difficult to organize change that would
benefit society as a whole. A growing commercialism may help "modern-
ize" this traditional society, but at the same time it is weakening informal
mechanisms of distribution through patronage, and may well lead to a
further concentration of assets so that the larger masses are not reached
by development. Finally, cities are growing rapidly, but are still small,
providing at best a modest outlet for the rural poor.
Demographic Processes
in Rural Bangladesh
We have described the local setting in which individual and family life
in Bangladesh is played out and have seen some of the changes now
taking place. A major factor in these changes, as we saw also at the ag-
gregate level, is the rapid pace of population growth. This puts ever-
increasing pressure on a restricted and uncertain environment, makes the
swift adoption of new productive technologies critical, and, with a limited
land area, causes a downward spiral of-land impoverishment whereby
the security of one's place in the distributional system becomes all im-
portant. In this section we examine the demographic processes that drive
Bangladesh's population growth, setting our analysis within the context
of the family. We begin by looking at mortality: how the falling death
rate has altered the family life cycle, how mortality processes work at
different levels of society, and the prospects for continued declines. In
discussing fertility the relevant context is not only the family but also
the distinctive place that women occupy within it in Bangladesh. After
setting this context we then go on to examine the actual mechanisms of
fertility in some detail: the biological constraints on numbers and timing
of births and the particular social and economic incentives that maintain
fertility at high levels.
The Family
under Changing Mortality
In the past three or four decades death rates have halved in Bangladesh.
For the family this means several changes: More children survive, parents
live longer, child dependency may have increased, more sons survive to
inherit land, and so on. We look at some of these changes now.
Most people belong to either nuclear or pahilineal extended families,
the latter usually organized as separate nuclear families grouped together
residentially as a homestead. Families, of course, have a life cycle, so
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at any time a substantial proportion of the population will be found living
singly or in other types of households than the nuclear or patrilineal type.
Table 4 indicates that in 1960 one-third of all households were "non-
standard" in this sense. Given Bangladesh's almost universal marriage,
the situation largely reflects demise of families through death of a spouse,
usually the husband.
Table 4
Distribution of Bangladesh Households
by Family Composition, 1960
Composition
of Household
One person only
Husband and wife only
Husband and/or wife with own children
Husband and/or wife with or without
own children but with parents and/or
daughter-in-law
Households comprising other relatives
or nonrelatives
All households
Distribution of Households (Percent)
Urban Areas Rural Areas Total
11 4 5
5 5 5
29 33 33
22 31 30
33 27 27
100 100 100
SOURCE: 1960 Housing Census (Census of Pakistan 1961, vol. 9, Table B).
The family life cycle starts with marriage. For the average woman
in Bangladesh this takes place before age 15. By age 20 only 5 percent of
women are still single; less than 0.1 percent never marry. Men tend to
marry in their 20s; the average age is 23, but with a bigger spread in age
than for women. There may have been a slight increase in marriage ages
in recent decades, particularly in the last 10 to 15 years; later we con-
sider the prospect for more substantial changes in the future.r.5 As we
noted earlier there is some doubt about the exact level of fertility, but a
total fertility rate of about seven children per woman may well prevail. 56
What has been the impact of mortality decline on family size? A
rough answer can be obtained by contrasting the process of family build-
ing under the present mortality regime with that of the 1930s, assuming
(realistically) that fertility patterns have remained much the same. Sup-
pose that in both cases a woman is married at age 15 to a man aged 23
and survives through her reproductive years. Figure 3 shows the result-
ing size and duration of the nuclear family in the two mortality regimes.
The family is assumed to break up with the death of the husband, whose
life expectancy at marriage would have been about 30 years in the 19305,
40 years in the 19705. (Figure 3 does not give any indication of variability
48 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH
Figure 3
Average Size and Duration (to Death of Husband>
of Nuclear Family in Bangladesh,
under Morality Regimes of 19305 and 19705
in mortality and fertility among families. For example, the poorest fami-
lies may still experience the older pattern of mortality. Some of this varia-
tion we discuss below; here we deal with the average.)
The main aspects of the new demographic situation now begin to
emerge. More children survive at all marriage durations: The new average
family is bigger. In the 1930s only about half of all children born reached
adulthood; in the present decade three-quarters do. (See Table 5 for
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approximate proportions of children surviving through childhood years.)
The male patriarch, living ten years longer than previously, lengthens his
period of domination over his family and causes a correspondingly longer
wait for his children to inherit. Land must now be <;livided among an
average of 2.4 surviving sons instead of 2.0, assuming that daughters are
bypassed. And with improving longevity for women as well as men, the
expected period of widowhood remains lengthy (around ten years),
a fact that becomes significant when we consider the dependent position
of women.
TableS
Approximate Age Pattern of Child Mortality,
Bangladesh, 19305, 19505, and 19705
(Excluding Effects of Major Disasters)
Age in Years
Probability of Surviving to Each Age (Percent)
1930s 1950s 1970s
1
2
5
10
15
72
65
58
55
52
80
75
70
67
65
85
81
78
76
75
SOURCES: Estimates for the 1930s and 1950s assume life expectancies of 28 and 38 years
respectively, distributed according to the Coale-Demeny West model pattern. Estimates
for the 1970s are taken from the life table derived from the 1974 Retrospective Survey.
The fact that more children survive than previously might seem to
imply that the burden of child dependency within the family has risen
substantially in recent years. Yet this is not necessarily so. Child depend-
ency in Bangladesh is difficult to define. Children are usually put to use-
ful work between the ages of six and ten, and by their early teens they
have ceased to be economically dependent.57 Moreover, in the early years
of marriage, when the dependency burden is greatest, the nuclear family
is quite likely to be part of a larger patrilineal family group. Most of
all, though, marriages (survival of both partners) in this new situation
last about ten years longer. Thus, although more children survive to
burden each family, the family has a longer productive life in which to
reap the benefits of these children. The higher dependency within the
population is scarcely noticeable within each family.
We can conclude that once the family is set up it does not experience
the results of the mortality decline very directly in its life cycle. Where,
then, are these demographic pressures felt? At one point in the life cycle
the economics of continued growth are experienced directly-in setting up
a household, when land must be subdivided or new means of st:stenance
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found. Even here, though, the way is likely to be smoothed by the patri-
lineal family. Many of these families, as we have seen, act to some degree
as corporate units-sons can farm patrilineal land, with the father holding
title until his death. To a lesser extent demographic pressures are also felt
when the family tries to enter a child into the stretched labor market.
Once a share of economic resources is procured, however, the family can
settle down to a life that would appear to be less steadily eroding than the
aggregate figures would show.
Mortality:
Processes and Prospects
While family life has lengthened, reflecting current lower mortality, qual-
ity of health in Bangladesh remains poor. Per capita protein and calorie
consumption, already at very low levels in the early 1960s, are estimated
to have declined over 1960-75. The deterioration was probably more pro-
nounced for the landless rural population and the urban poor, both of
whom experienced a substantial drop in real wages in this period.58 Chen
and Chaudhury (1975) think it likely that average body weight declined
in the 1960s. Malnutrition impedes both physical and mental development
of the young and, through its weakening of the body's defense systems, is
a basic contributor to mOltality and morbidity in the population as a whole.
In the conventional cause-of-death categories, the largest contribu-
tion to present overall mortality is from diarrheal diseases (including
some cholera), which may now account for as much as a third of all
deaths. Other significant contributors are tuberculosis and other respira-
tory diseases, tetanus (an important cause of neonatal mortality), and the
usual chronic diseases of old age, which have become more salient as
epidemic diseases are reduced. 59
There is little direct evidence on the prevalence of illness in the pop-
ulation, but it is undoubtedly high. Public knowledge of disease trans-
mission is primitive and health services are sparse. 60 For even moderate
death rates from infectious and parasitic diseases to persist, a large pro-
portion of the population must suffer from these diseases and experience
the enervation and low morale that go with them.
Likely future trends in mortality are difficult to assess. Mortality
risks, far from being equally distributed through the population, closely
reflect access to the local economy. To simplify matters somewhat, two
mortality processes can be seen at work, one for those above subsistence,
the other for those thrown upon the margins. For those above subsistence,
much will depend on further progress in public health. Relatively easy
treatment for diarrheal diseases now exists through the prevention of
dehydration (oral rehydration therapy), which has yet to be widely
exploited. Greater availability of antibiotics and advances in general
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health education would also have potentially important effects on mortal-
ity. All of these, however, call for substantial improvements in the level of
health services. For the above-subsistence death rate to continue to fall,
development of an effective health infrastructure is probably more im-
portant than dramatic improvements in the economy.
Those compelled to subsist at the margins-whether geographic or
economic-face much higher mortality risks. On the margins of settlement
-for example the char lands in the delta mouth-recurrent flooding and
tidal bores cause high disaster fatalities (see Table 1). For those forced
onto the economic margins-a numerically more impOitant group-a less
dramatic process occurs. These families become gradually cut off from
the distributional system, and in hard years are the first to die. Figures
are scant. Data from an intensive study of one small rural locality indicate
child mortality rates for the poor nearly double those of the well-off, and
an even greater class differential in the frequency of widowhood in
middle life. 61 Another village study, giving figures from a famine year,
shows death rates in landless families three to four times those of families
with more than 1.2 hectares (see Table 6).
Table 6
Death Rates by Family Landholding
in a Famine Year, Companiganj Thana,
Noakhali District, 1975
Size of Landholding
(Hectares)
o
Less than 0.2
0.2-1.2
More than 1.2
SOURCE: McCord (1976).
Crude Death Rate
(Per 1,000)
35.8
28.4
21.5
12.2
Death Rate of
Children Aged
1-4
(Per 1,000)
86.5
48.2
49.1
17.5
Overall, therefore, we see a bifurcated mortality process in Bangla-
desh: lower risks for those who are well-off, much higher risks for those
on the margins. With growing impoverishment, this second type of mor-
tality could become more dominant. Rough calculations show that the
process of increasing marginality through landlessness could add two to
three points to the average crude death rate in the next decade. But
preoccupation with average rates makes little sense when mortality varies
so widely by class: Improvements in the national average would be small
comfort to the many who risk being pushed downward in the economic
scale to face a distinctly harsher regime of mortality.
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Women and the Family
Before discussing fertility it is worth pausing to look at the place of
women in Bangladesh. This subject scarcely arose in our earlier survey of
economic and social organization, for in Bangladesh as in few other coun-
tries women's work anq social life lie within the household and their
status is conferred by husband or son. Very few women work in the fields
or in other jobs away from the house. For the most part, activities in
rural areas are clearly divided between the sexes. Men undertake the
outside stages of grain production-sowing, crop husbandry, and harvest-
ing; women take on the stages that can conveniently be pedormed within
the household compound-husking, parboiling, and preparing next year's
crop. Women also fulfill the usual rural household duties: care of chil-
dren, preparation of meals, and possibly care of a few domestic animals.62
We have already argued that the main problem for the individual
man in a marginal environment is to tie himself into the distributional
system-to purchase security through any available economic or social
means. Women are more constrained in their search for security. Indi-
vidual initiative is largely ruled out. Strong traditions of purdah dictate
that respectable women do not engage in trade or fieldwork or leave the
family for other than traditionally specified visits to relatives. Separation
and divorce are real threats, especially if the woman proves to be child-
less.83 And early loss of the husband's ability to provide, through illness
or death, can become a disaster for a family in its middle years. 84 These
threats of loss, together with social restrictions on acting for themselves,
put women in a position of high risk that rises as life progresses. Women
respond by strengthening what familial bonds of security they can. The
part inheritance allowed to daughters under Islamic law (half that to
which a son is entitled) is usually unclaimed, but bartered to a brother
in exchange for a promise of later security should they be widowed or
divorced.85 Fulfillment of duties to one's husband and larger family takes
on a special importance, as does production of sons as a guarantee for
later years. Thus, women strengthen whatever lateral and vertical family
ties they can, but in doing so they find themselves carrying out roles
dictated by the interests of husband, sons, or husband's family.
H husband and wife have separate but unspoken strategies to protect
their interests and security, so, too, does the family as a whole. The
degree of purdah observed is part of family strategy. Purdah provides
respectability and status. It enhances marriage prospects for daughters
and helps maintain the family position and name-a valuable asset that
yields power and influence in dealings with the community. Thus, al-
though its demands are costly and restrictive, when families become
better off they tend to keep stricter purdah.08
Marriage of sons and daughters is a highly planned part of family
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strategy; as in most of the subcontinent, it is an arrangement between
families. Early marriage enables larger family interests to dominate those
of the young couple in the first 'few years. And where high fertility is
valued, it allows the family as a whole time to accumulate children
despite the long lactation periods that prevail in Bangladesh-a strategy
that goes far toward maximizing the chance that children will not only
be born but also will survive past the high-mortality years of infancy.
. Different treatment of sons and daughters also reflects family inter-
ests at work. Daughters do useful household work, but unlike sons are
not in a position to bring in outside wages or provide later support. Under
such circumstances, it falls within family interests to pass on daughters at
an early age but to hold sons as long as possible-a factor that may con-
,tribute to the large sex difference in age at marriage.
In each of these cases, behavior rational to the family helps perpetu-
ate a position of low autonomy for women.
Fertility:
Constraints and Supports
The high level of fertility in Bangladesh occurs fairly uniformly across
regions and classes. Larger landowners have slightly higher fertility than
average; poorer women and urban women tend to have fewer children,
but all the differences are small. Lower average fertility does seem to
prevail among the urban middle class, but this group is of insignificant
size and is unlikely to absorb large numbers in the next two decades. 61
Although average fertility varies little across groups, within any group
of women variation can be large, reflecting mainly the biology of the
process. For currently married women in their 40s in 1974, the distribu-
tion by children ever born is shown in Figure 4. About 50 percent of the
women had borne six or more children, while 30 percent had borne four
or fewer. Relatively small numbers of births in a completed family are
by no means rare.
In the absence of any obvious reasons that birth rates should be
changing, it has been conventional to assume a roughly constant level of
fertility over past decades (see Figure 2). There are, however, year-to-
year fluctuations-for example, a substantial drop in the year following
the 1971 war and again after the 1974 famine. 68
It is clearly important to try to explain why fertility is at its current
level. Later in this section we argue that social and economic pressures
on families combine to push fertility upward to a natural limit. Yet, with
a female reproductive life of 35 years or more and with early and uni-
versal marriage, why should that limit be a total fertility rate as low as
seven? Rates between eight and ten have been reliably recorded' in popu-
lations with later age at marriage than in Bangladesh. (Figure 5 compares
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the age pattern of fertility in Bangladesh with one such population, the
Hutterites of North America.) The answer is best given by listing the
main factors, mostly biological and partly due to societal arrangements,
that constrain Bangladesh's fertility below these extreme levels.
Figure 4
Distribution of Women Aged 40-49
by Number of Children Ever Born,
Bangladesh, 1974
First among factors depressing natural fertility is the fact that women
in Bangladesh experience periods of lactational amenorrhea (i.e., sup-
pression of ovulation as a consequence of breastfeeding) that are among
the longest ever recorded. Extended breastfeeding is the main reason
Bangladesh is not reproducing like the Hutterites. Lactational amenor-
rhea accounts for nearly 19 months of the average 34-month interval
between births. Since it is not difficult to visualize forces that would tend
tq shorten breastfeeding, there is a constant threat hanging over prospects
for fertility reduction. H the lactational period were reduced so that
amenorrhea lasted only 11 months, the level prevailing in Punjab, total
fertility would be 25 percent higher. 60 (Of course, mortality would also
increase with shortened lactation because of the removal of the protec-
tion that breastfeeding and birth spacing afford to infants. The net
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Figure 5
Age-Specific Fertility Rates in Bangladesh, 1974,
Compared with an Extreme "Natural" Fertility Schedule
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increase in surviving children could be quite small.7°) Nutritional inade-
quacies suffered by poorer women add slightly to the length of amenor-
rhea. 71
Less important as a depressant to fertility, but still significant, is
absence of the husband through death, divorce, or occupational migra-
tion. We have already mentioned the high frequency of widowhood
toward the end of the reproductive years. Husbands are considerably
older than wives, so that remarriage prospects for women are few (and
are further reduced by social disapproval). A rough calculation using
1961 marital status data suggests that fertility could be 6 percent higher
if all husbands survived until their wives reached the end of their repro-
ductive years.72 For divorce, a similar calculation gives a fertility effect
of 5 percent. Physical separation of couples as a result of seasonal or other
kinds of occupational migration is difficult to measure, but not negligible.
One study estimates that it lowers fertility by 10 percent.73 Differential
mortality and migration probably account for most of the class difference
in fertility.
As a factor in redUcing fertility, primary sterility appears to be rela-
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tively unimportant in Bangladesh. The 1961 census found only 5 percent
childlessness among married women over age 45; the 1974 Retrospective
Survey found 4 percent.74 Of course, female sterility would often be a
reason for divorce; so this category overlaps the previous one. It is not
clear just how much secondary sterility exists, but with the high morbidity
levels it may be substantial. 7G This is probably the main reason for the
quite large numbers of women with low completed fertility in Figure 4.
FiilalIy, contraceptiqn is not at present a major factor depressing fer-
tility in Bangladesh. The 1968-69 National Impact Survey recorded only
3.7 percent current users of contraception among married women of
reproductive age.78 U used effectively, contraception of this amount
would mean a birth rate of at most 3 to 4 percent below its level in the
total absence of use. There is no reason to suppose more than a slight
increase in the user rate over the last decade. The problem is partly a lack
of knowledge of modem contraception and very limited access to regular
supplies and services. The extent of demand for contraception is a con-
troversial issue still to be fully resolved, but little evidence points to a
latent demand of large proportions.77 An important experiment under-
taken in Matlab thana in ComiIla seeks to probe the limits of contracep-
tive demand by a saturation distribution scheme. Results indicate a ceil-
ing of around 17 to 18 percent of married women in reproductive ages
using the proffered supplies (a peak attained after three months), tailing
off after two years to less than 10 percent despite continued intensive
effort put into the supply system.78 Abstinence, a sure contraceptive
method available to all, does not seem to be much used as an intentional
measure for controHing births. For example, the taboo against sexual
relations during breastfeeding, observed in many other cultures, is not
strong in Bangladesh, nor is tenninal abstinence after becoming a grand-
parent. (Breastfeeding itself does not seem to be used consciously for its
contraceptive value, although evidence on this point is weak. It is possible
that the usual practice of a wife's going to live with her mother for birth
and subsequent recuperation is sometimes extended as a means of birth
spacing.)
While satisfactory as an explanation of how completed total fertility
comes to be seven and not nine or ten, we have not yet asked why fertility
rates should be pushing against biological limits despite rapidly worsen-
ing man-land ratios and increasing impoverishment-trends that are well
recognized by the people themselves.79 We would not of course expect
to see rapid adjustment to the new mortality conditions, but a genera-
tion should be a long enough time period to detect substantial signs of
change. Yet fertility continues to remain high throughout the rural sector.
It is hard to believe that high fertility in Bangladesh is merely the
result of blindness to choice. Certainly when we look at some of the
individual efforts to improve economic position by adopting whatever
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means can be found, we see that peasants in Bangladesh as much as else-
where seem quick to sense opportunities for even marginal progress.
Perhaps it could be argued that the lack of access to modem contracep-
tion maintains fertility at high levels. But we have also seen that it is
hard to give weight to this factor. Primitive means of contraception have
always been available, and modem contraceptives offered on a saturatiop
basis have generated at best a lukewarm response.
It is at the level of economic and social pressures that fertility sup-
ports are most likely to be found. It is difficult, however, to unravel the
complex network of incentives. Starting at the family level, it is likely that
in a situation close to subsistence, extra hands, especially male ones that
can bring in a useful wage before age ten, could make a substantial differ-
ence to the family's well-being. Children are profitable as an investment.
Evidence from the recent village study by Mead Cain (1977) supports
this view: By age 12 the average male child has become a net producer;
by age 15 he has compensated for his cumulative consumption; and by
age 22 he has repaid the investment in himself and one sister. Parents
therefore realize a net return on children, a return that would be lower
if rural wages fell further, but one that would be higher if sisters' house-
hold work were valued and if later family support were included. This
is not to say that parents perform any conscious calculations on fertility,
but an awareness of the advantage of children as extra income can well
be present in high degree.
The finding that children are profitable after 15 or so years in a
society that lives close to the margin may not be sufficient to show that
high fertility makes sense. The early years of childhood are a consumption
drain, and under circumstances where day-to.day survival dominates any
future payoff, why should parents carry the extra burdens of child con-
sumption? It is here that we refer back to our discussion of the family.
For the early years of marriage, we found that the patrilineal family
lightens much of the burden of childbearing; later we saw that at no
particular point in the life cycle do incentives against childbearing build
up. And women, in their special position of dependence, find sons the
highest form of security against privations of widowhood. Cain makes
a further interesting point here. In rural Bangladesh, if a husband is
incapacitated or dies before his eldest son is old enough to assume control
of family property, the family faces a period of extreme vulnerability
when assets are easily lost through lack of male labor or through social
predation.8o Future security therefore makes it important for women not
only to have sons, but also to have them as early as possible in the marital
life cycle.
Economic interests in producing children vary somewhat by class.
For the relatively affiuent landowner, better survival prospects of chil-
dren are probably not sufficient incentive to cut back fertility. Children
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can be educated, sent to cities, and used to expand his local power. Sub-
division of land among children poses little threat: Family holdings can
be augmented through marriage and by purchase or foreclosure of mort-
gages, and other occupational outlets are increasingly available.
For those lower down, children provide, besides direct labor, the
only real security against loss of holdings and penury in later years. Thus,
whether parents are concerned mostly for their own welfare or for that
of their children as well, high fertility is an advantage. That the children
themselves are then likely to inherit plots too small to support a family, a
factor assumed to favor low fertility among the peasant proprietors of
preindustrial Europe, is necessarily here a secondary concern. The ex-
treme uncertainties of the local social and economic setting do nothing to
encourage growth of peasant proprietorship in Bangladesh.
At the bottom of society, lack of security overrides all other con-
cerns. To the extent that attachment to a patron is possible, children can
add "pleading power" as claimants in the labor market.81 And at this
level childhood (and maternal) mortality runs highest. Families count
themselves lucky if they can produce enough births so that even one son
survives to adulthood.82
It could well be argued that high-fertility behavior, though sensible
for parents, runs counter to the interests of the local society and, there-
fore, that powerful social pressures might arise to oppose it. But for this
to happen the local socioeconomic structure must be able to transmit and
signal to parents the interests of the community at large. The pattern of
social organization in Bangladesh that we outlined earlier appears sing-
ularly ill suited to such a task. Lines of social influence run through kin
and patronage groups, whose membership and territorial boundaries are
fluid and whose chief concerns are in serving the economic and political
interests of the dominant families within them. High fertility poses little
threat to those interests. At a lower level the patriarchal family can
enforce early marriage and support high fertility of the nuclear unit by
sharing the dependency burden of children and by awarding status with
achievement of motherhood.83
We have sketched a picture in which the separate interests of ex-
tended families, of most nuclear families, and of factional groups press
fertility to levels detrimental to the community at large. If each of these
groups gains separately from its own actions, who then bears the costs?
Three categories of people do. The community as defined by geographical
location suffers through constant lowering of wages and use of scarce
resources. Younger wives who are induced to deliver births at a rate
beyond their wishes and sometimes their capacity also suffer. But most
of all it is the next generation that loses-the people who in 15 to 20
years will somehow have to find new means of subsistence, move to
marginal land, or attach themselves to the factional system. Fertility in
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Bangladesh has not fallen, because these are precisely the three groups
that have traditionally had no way to organize to protect their interests:
Unborn children by definition have no voice; women as yet have little
standing outside the family; and villages or other territorially bounded
social units in Bangladesh have a minimal role in the society.
Prospects
In describing the context of rural development and demographic be-
havior, we have been led to questions of economic class, social organiza-
tion, family structure, and local government. \Ve have seen how the
individual aim of achieving security and a share of the social product
in a tightening environment can act against collective demographic and
development interests. And we have noted the special historical circum-
stances of the region that have left behind a power structure in which
national ability to influence events quickly fades with administrative
distance from Dacca.
What does the future hold for Bangladesh, and what questions of
development strategy does the country face? We cannot expect to arrive
at a narrow range of likely outcomes, both because of the innate uncer-
tainties of the future and because much depends on the scope and direc-
tion of government action. But we can layout the bounds of future
development, separating the plausible from the highly unlikely. This
done, we can trace some of the changes that will affect the course of
development within these bounds.
The Broad Picture
Growth of population numbers must be expected to show the usual
demographic inertia. If fertility and mortality change little from their
present levels, the country would contain around 160 million people by
the year 2000; if there were dramatic declines in both (as set out in the
top panel of Table 7), the country would still have around 130 million
people. Catastrophes of the magnitude recently experienced, as Baldwin
(1977) has shown, leave the course of population growth little altered.8t
One way or another, Bangladesh will probably have to support a popu-
lation between 60 and 80 percent larger than its present size by the turn
of the century and one that may then (as now) still be increasing by
more than 2 million a year.
The main hopes for supporting these greater numbers lie with rapid
agricultural development through improved water control, high-yielding
crop varieties, and other components of the Green Revolution technology.
Earlier we noted the apparent technological feasibility of a three- or even
60
Table 7
Population Projections,
Bangladesh, 1978-2000
POPULAnON AND DEVELOPMENT ｉ ｾ BANGLADESH
Projection 1978 1988 2000
Rapidly declining mortality and fertility
Birth rate (per 1,(00) 45 31 20
Death rate (per 1,(00) 17 12 8
Population (millions) 85 109 128
World Bank "probable" projection a
Birth rate (per 1,(00) 46 36 30
Death rate (per 1,(00) 18 14 10
Population (millions) 85 113 148
Continuing high mortality and fertility
Birth rate (per 1,(00) 47 43 40
Death rate (per 1,(00) 19 18 17
Population (millions) 85 116 159
a Bangladesh, Population and Nutrition Projects Department (1975, Annex 14-16); ad-
justed for consistency with revised 1974 census total, and with 1974 Retrospective Survey
mortality estimates.
fourfold increase in rice production within a few decades; however, our
subsequent account of the rural setting should serve to temper excessive
optimism. It is highly likely that food production will lag far behind such
possibilities, although it should not prove too difficult to achieve increases
that more than keep abreast of population growth. But for families in
agriculture the outlook depends as much on distribution as on total out-
put. Those with substantial land will profit most from the new technology,
both by direct productivity gains and, barring shifts in the present pattern
of local administration, by their influence over local irrigation and dis-
tribution of needed inputs. Among marginal landholders the process of
land impoverishment will continue, worsening present inequalities. And
for the landless, the greater labor intensity of the high-yielding crop vari-
eties is unlikely to do much to shore up rural wage levels faltering under
pressure of a rapidly expanding work force. Nonagricultural employment
on a scale able to absorb substantial numbers of those pushed off the land
is difficult to visualize, but the pace at which such employment can be
created will largely determine the welfare prospects for the bottom half
of the rural population.
On the industrial side we saw a number of opportunities for sustained
if modest growth, diversifying from the present jute manufacturing base.
Natural gas will afford a large measure of energy self-sufficiency, at least
for the next few decades, and already serves as feedstock for a growing
fertilizer industry; however, other natural resources are lacking. Foreign
exchange shortages may be eased somewhat by new revenues from
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natural gas exports and by a lessening need for food imports. (Direct
foreign assistance net of debt ｳ ･ ｲ ｶ ｩ ｾ ･ will probably not again reach the
levels of the early years of independence.) Whether Bangladesh can
emulate the few developing countries that have mc..ved successfully into
manufactured exports is doubtful. Uncertainties here, besides domestic
conditions, include future economic and political relations with India-
with its enormous market and strong industrial base-and the scope of
trade concessions in any new economic order beiween rich and poor
nations. The most optimistic projection of growth in Bangladesh's indus-
trial economy is probably that of Faaland and Parkinson (1976, p. 174),
who think that an annual growth rate of 10 percent should be attainable
under favorable conditions-a rate that would in 25 years create a sector
comparable in size to agriculture. A more plausible projected rate of in-
crease might be that of Indian industry over recent decades, an average of
about 6 percent per year. 85 As yet there is little sign of rapid growth getting
under way: Present industry, operating in a climate of regulatory uncer-
tainty, price changes, and intermittent shortages of foreign exchange and
spare parts, has barely recovered from the 1971 war.86 Moreover, as
important as aggregate growth in looking to Bangladesh's industrial de-
velopment are choices concerning scale of enterprise, capital intensity,
public or private ownership, and decentralization. Continuing political
uncertainties leave these choices open.
What of the urban future of Bangladesh? If cities continue to in-
crease at their recent rate, by the year 2000 about 30 percent of the popu-
lation would live in urban areas. Even at this comparatively modest level
of urbanization, cities would have to absorb another 35 million people.
Put another way, the economy would have to support another 15 to 20
cities the present size of Dacca-or, more likely, a few vast urban ag-
glomerations surrounding Dacca-Narayanganj, Chittagong, and perhaps
Khulna. Under realistic assumptions on economic trends, this rate of
urbanization is likely to be an upper limit. But even with slower economic
expansion, cities may still grow at close to this pace; for whatever the
increase in their industrial, commercial, and governmental labor force,
they will inevitably also remain a dumping ground for the extruded rural
poor. Urban growth depends on more than the speed and nature of in-
dustrialization.
In sum, allowing for a certain measure of speculation, the present
situation can continue. In all probability, by the year 2000 the country
will remain heavily rural; population ..vill be larger by about two-thirds;
agricultural output per head may have gained modest ground; and a high
proportion of the rural population, probably more than half, will be land-
less. Per capita income will be higher, markedly so at the top of the
distribution. For the majority of families, life will go on much as before,
perceptibly better if things go well, harsher if they do not.
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We have put rough bounds on the paths of several development vari-
ables: population, agricultural output, industry, and urbanization. More
important than the actual levels attained at the end of the century, how-
ever, are the quality and direction of the development process at that
time and the values and organization of society that support this process.
These deeper aspects of the economic and demographic system will
determine whether the outlook in the twenty-first century will be one of
promise or of disaster. In the years just ahead, much depends on the kind
of social change taking place in the countryside, on the possibilities of
rapid fertility decline, on the effectiveness of government intervention in
development, and on whether the local economic system can be organized
for sustained growth. To these questions we now tUl11.
Social Change
We have already pointed to the emergence of a more pronounced class
structure in rural Bangladesh as subsistence peasants are shaken out of
their place in the economy and added to the landless or near landless.
The new agricultural technology will in all likelihood hasten this process,
both by directly increasing inequality and by giving further impetus to
the commercialization of farming-sharpening the once hazy line be-
tween landowner and wage laborer.
It is difficult to predict the outcome of increasing class prominence.
Certainly it will do much to weaken the social stability resulting from kin
and patronage ties. But factionalism is unlikely to disappear. Even in a
commercial economy, control over employment and much else will remain
in the hands of a few-a basis for continued recruitment of dependents.
Rural class conflict will probably be mirrored in a strengthening of antag-
onisms between national political groups, and the possibility that this
conflict will lead to a radical reorganization of the entire society cannot
be ruled out.
New avenues of social mobility are beginning to appear. While the
most deprived elements of the rural population have little chance of
improving their lot, even if they move to the towns, for others there are
increasing opportunities for upward mobility that bypass the traditional
status hierarchy of rural society. Education is one route; attachment to
the lower fringes of the administrative system is another. The new role
of 'orokering" between government programs and the local population is
particularly powerful, although for the most part such opportunities have
so far fallen to the traditional village elite.81
These contacts with the more modem parts of the economy serve
to channel into the countryside new attitudes toward such things as the
role of women, the value of education, age at marriage, and contracep-
tion. Government extension workers concerned with particular programs
(irrigation, family planning, and so on) are another conduit into village
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life; and there is a small but increasing amount of travel between village
and town. 88 But the tangible realities of life may limit the degree to
which new ideas can take hold. For the considerable fraction of the
population at bare subsistence level, the notion of modernity scarcely
applies. For them, a mode!-'I1izing society may well be one in which their
former place in the scheme of things no longer exists.
Deepening class divisions, as well as the slow appearance of modern
attitudes, work to change the position of women. \Vomen who are pushed
downward in society through loss of husband or land join those who
cannot afford the costs and restrictions of purdah and become free
to take on new roles. Women's cooperatives, for example, have found
their recruits typically to be drawn not from the elite but from the
widowed, the landless, and the destitute. 89 But there appears little pros-
pect under present arrangements that change in women's roles will "trickle
up" from the bottom of society. Gradual diffusion of new attitudes from
the small, educated elite is the more likely source of change.
Under this pattern of change, and assuming no abrupt moves in
social organization, it is difficult to see where strong incentives to restrict
fertility will come from. For most families, children would continue for
some time to provide income and security in a shaky environment. Large
improvements in access to family planning services would of course help:
Mopping up the residue of existing or easily drummed-up demand for
birth control in Bangladesh might lower fertility by about 15 percent-to
a birth rate of around 40 per thousand. Increases in age at marriage could
also have a significant impact in reducing fertility. The changes we have
described pose little immediate disincentive to early marriage, although
their effects may mount up. To offset such factors, however, is the possi-
bility of shortening periods of lactation.
Fertility declines are not of value irrespective of how they are
achieved. A fall in the birth rate, for example, would be one likely con-
sequence of a further deterioration of lUral conditions-a product of
worsening health status, physical separation of couples caused by labor
migration, and general disintegration of stable family life. Children could
even cease to be a paying proposition under such circumstances, adding
voluntary pressure to this involuntary decline.po
To summarize, we would not look for a major decline in fertility in
Bangladesh in the next 10 to 15 years. A more likely pattern would be
somewhat lower fertility for that part of the population whose circum-
stances are worsening, together with a slow chipping away of the fertility
rate of the rest as contraceptive delivery spreads, women define new
roles for themselves, and mortality, especially infant mortality, improves.
This not very hopeful outlook supposes continuation of the present social
and economic arrangements in rural areas. Under different circumstances
demographic prospects could be radically altered.
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Government Action
We have explored the likely consequences of technological and social
change; what of development through direct government action? The
characteristic approach to development policy of the Bangladesh gov-
ernment, as of most others, could be described as programmatic. Succes-
sive governments over the past 30 years have set up a variety of programs
designed to promote rural development and restrain fertility. The Inte-
grated Rural Development Programme, growing out of the Comilla
cooperatives, and the Rural Public Works Programme were mentioned
earlier. Others include the Village Agricultural and Industrial Develop-
ment Programme, the Thana Irrigation Programme, and a wide array of
pilot programs concerned with agricultural extension, literacy, health,
and so on. In family planning, a large-scale operation has been mounted,
initially involving clinic-based services and later female paramedics based
in the villages.01
The record of these programs is at best described as mixed. Many
have shown encouraging results on a small scale, when close monitoring
and supervision were feasible. But as the programs have been extended
geographically and to encompass more activities ("integrated"), the
results have become less impressive. For the most part, as we have seen,
the programs have come up against local realities-a rural social system
that works after a fashion, possesses a measure of stability, and is able to
adapt to its own purposes the best intentions of planners.
There are also instances of privately sponsored rural development
efforts in small regions that have been reported to be very successful.
These include producer cooperatives, health clinics, women's organiza-
tions, and even village-level efforts to limit population growth.92 While
of considerable interest in themselves and for their potential to shed light
on feasible mechanisms by which communities can be organized, these
efforts have yet to demonstrate any value as pilot projects for countrywide
programs. The effectiveness of the Swanirvar (village self-reliance)
movement, recently initiated by the government, may provide an inter-
esting test of this question. As this movement solidifies into a program,
there seem few reasons to expect it to escape the problems that have
beset its predecessors. But its promise if it can do so is considerable.93
In spite of their mixed success, most government programs do push
development in the right direction. Intensified and well-managed cam-
paigns can provide some relief for rural underemployment, disseminate
new agricultural techniques with greater rapidity, and reduce fertility
slightly. And program activities themselves do eventually affect social
structure. There is no doubt, for example, that the manifold agricultural
development opportunities sketched out by Noazesh Ahmed (1976) if
acted upon would, through the resulting economic change, radically
alter rural social organization and probably also demographic behavior.
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But there remains the question of whether a programmatic approach
is appropriate to Bangladesh's development predicament. Planners natu-
rally tend to think of policy interventions in terms of inputs and outputs.
For large development projects-Hood control works, irrigation channels,
industrial plants-this is the obvious way to assess feasibility and effec-
tiveness. But with less centralized and less material activities-in particu-
lar, rural development and population control-maintaining a similar
approach may distort emphasis and obscure important problems. We
have argued that the critical policy issues lie in the area of local politics
and social organization: how the interests of local factions and dominant
families are pursued at the expense of the community as a whole, and
how new political and material resources entering the rural society can
serve to strengthen rather than erode this pattern. These structural issues
are not merely "obstacles" to program design and operation, to be taken
care of, as it were, at the stage of implementation; rather, they are the
stuff of development itself and should be the main objects of policy.
Strategy and Style
In speculating on future prospects and government's part in them, we
have deliberately avoided proposing any package of national policies. In
a country whose national government has at best only limited purchase
on local be:lavior, most policy proposals would necessarily be moot. Sug-
gestions, say, for strengthening cooperatives or for raising the legal mar-
riage age would chieHy serve to expose these limitations. Bangladesh's
experience with cooperatives is rivaled by that of few other countries, and
continued failings in this area are not for want of understanding. And
for marriage the legal minimum age for' women already stands at 16, in
spite of which most are married at younger ages.94 In these final
remarks, then, we confine ourselves to some general observations at the
level of development strategy.
We would conclude from our analysis of Bangladesh's development
and demographic situation that the country's present problems are less
the result of not having some "right" combination of national policies
than they are the consequence of a local societal structure that the gov-
ernment cannot quite reach. At its lowest levels the present administrative
system mirrors the interests of the larger landowners and factional
leaders. Thus, national government intentions and local economic and
demographic realities typically work at cross purposes, impeding devel-
opment results. An effective local administrative system able to harness
powedul but presently conflicting social forces could do much to align
individual behavior with the collective interest.
There are many ways in which effective local organization might
be achieved, and several Asian models might be adapted to the special
needs of Bangladesh. The recent experience of Indonesia under the "New
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Order" regime indicates one option: pressing government influence down-
ward through society and designing local incentives to ensure that com-
munity interests (broadly defined, it is hoped) dominate. In Java, equal in
area, population, and straitened circumstances to Bangladesh, incentives
were imposed through a greatly strengthened administrative system; this
has aheady yielded signi6cantresults in birth control, but it is still too early
to assess its economic outcome or to weigh the long-run implications of the
pervasive militarization of local government that underlies it. An alterna-
tive strategy, less harsh in some respects, harsher in others, is to limit admin-
istration to levels above the local community, making small territorial
units responsible for their activities and relying on internal social pres-
sures to bring individual behavior in line ｷ ｾ ｴ ｨ the community ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ ･ ｳ ｾ Ｎ
This strategy, similar to the one that operates in rural China below the
commune level, would present problems in Bangledesh, where natural
territorial units are weak and where current social change is, if anything,
further eroding what territorial cohesion there is. Yet possibilities exist.
The Chinese commune, a purely administrative unit, is roughly similar
in size to the Bangladesh union. The commune's constituent villages (pro-
duction brigades) and work groups (production teams) have at best only
weak counterparts in Bangladesh at present, but it might prove possible
to make either gram or para into solidary social units in a Bangladesh
rural development strategy.911 Rural development models that involve less
all-embracing organizational forms are also available. In the Bangladesh
setting an option may be to build separate organizational bases to pro-
mote rapid growth of agricultural output and to ensure the rural land-
less of access to the economy.
Whatever means is chosen to reach down to the local level, effective
social change undoubtedly requires a local setting much better able to
afford security to the individual. A major theme of this paper has been
that the interests of rural people in an uncertain and unhealthy environ-
ment are best served by behavior that guarantees some access to local
product and that lowers risks. Attachment to patrons, exploitation of
scarce local resources, adoption of roles of dependency, maintenance of
family position through such means as purdah, and use of high fertility
to insure against loss of land, children, or husband may yield access to
the local distributive system; but above all they provide security. In
aggregate, though, these modes of behavior act against collective interests
and lend power and stability to the forces behind the present predica-
ment. Much could be done to provide security at the local level-eco-
nomically, through surer access to employment, credit, agricultural in-
puts, and irrigation; and demographically, through measures that pro-
long the lives of husband and children and reduce the gap in age between
husband and wife. But more important than specific measures, if the
new local system is to help break down the uncertainties that preserve
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high fertility and stifle individual initiative, it must provide a setting in
which the individual looks to the community and his position within it
for support and security, and less to the capricious favors of landlord or
patriarch.
This need for effective structural organization has its counterpart in
the industrial sector. Effective industrial development would call for a
secure institutional environment for production, a need that goes much
deeper than the usual demand for infrastructure.
The type of "intennediate level" strategy-directed at a level between
the national government and the individual-that we see as essential to
tackle the problems of Bangladesh is more a matter of structural change
than of programmatic policy. Even with abrupt transfers of political
power, it would be no short-tenn task. What is missing at present in
Bangladesh that would greatly ease such a task is a coherent development
style-an overall strategy that works toward a single purpose, that aligns
interests in the same direction, and that cuts through conflicting objec-
tives. The present array of loosely organized programs and ad hoc incen-
tives is more a complex reaction to the pressures of urban interest groups,
international agencies, and the rural power structure than a singleminded
instrument of development.
The next years in Bangladesh could see the emergence of very differ-
ent types of political regimes. Whatever the political color of the gov-
ernment, its success in development tenns will likely be measured by its
will and administrative reach to cut across local interests and influence
economic and demographic behavior for the national good. If this does
not come about, the present situation can continue for a while and popu-
lation growth with it; but the possibility of real development will recede
further into the future.
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1. Moghul influence dates bacle to
the thirteenth century. On the economy
of pre-Muslim Bengal see Majumdar
(1943), chapter 16. Later accounts are
cited in N. Ahmad (1968), chapters :h5.
2. Contributing to the disappearance
of East Bengal's textile industry were
the effects of the Great Bengal Famine
(1769-76), followed by several years of
devastating ftoods and famine in the
17805, the subsequent reorganization of
the revenue collection system under the
Permanent Settlement policy, and the
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high tariff imposed to protect British
products. See N. Ahmad (1968), pp.
100-104, and M. A. Islam (1968). A
small jute hand loom industry grew up
for some decades in the nineteenth cen-
tury, only to be supplanted by the Cal-
cutta mills.
3. Historical data on city size are
often suspect, but there is evidence of a
substantial population decline in Dacca.
Estimates are 200.000 in 1780 and about
70,000 in 1838. See N. Ahmad (1968),
p.104.
4. A UN estimate of material dam-
age caused by the war was US$1.2 bil-
lion; losses in the transport sector and in
housing were especially severe. See
Faaland and Parkinson (1976), p. 12,
and N. Islam (1974). Other disruptions
resulted from the departure of West
Pakistani managers and civil servants.
5. For two accounts of policy dUring
this period, before the denoument be-
came apparent, see Papanek (1967) and
Haq (1963). Estimates of the transfer of
resources from East to West Pakistan
(highly dependent on exchange rate as-
sumptions) range from US$1.5 to 3.0
billion for the period 1947-69 (Faaland
and Parkinson, 1976, pp. 7-8).
6. Historical productivity data are of
course scarce, although indications can
be drawn from relative constancy of cul-
tivating techniques. Some studies of
yields of the major crops from 1892 to
1947 are noted by N. Ahmad (1968), p.
191, who concludes: "Therefore, at best,
productivity and yields may be regarded
as constant, though betraying a tendency
towards deterioration." Rice yields have
risen only slightly in subsequent decades
-about 15 percent between 1952 and
1974 (N. Ahmed, 1976, p. 20). Jute
yields show no clear trend over the past
30 years.
7. Permanent Settlement gave rev-
enue collectors proprietory rights over
large estates (the zamindari system).
See Tepper (1970), chapter 1, and M. A.
Islam (1968) on the background and
effects of this policy. It is of course easy
to exaggerate the impact of the colonial
intervention: The likely bias in this di-
rection in both domestic and Western
scholarship is noted by Morris and Stein
(1961 ).
8. In the late nineteenth century a
network of local councils (some nomi-
nally elected) was set up at the district
level and below, but turned out to be
relatively powerless. The lowest level of
council covered an area of several rev-
enue villages, called a union. In 1919 the
Village Self-Government Act established
elected Union Boards with limited au-
thority over local administration. See
Tepper (1970) for a useful institutional
history of preindependence Bangladesh.
9. See N. Ahmad (1968) and er-
Rashid (1967) for comprehensive ac-
counts of the physical geography of
Bangladesh.
10. Of total cropped area about 80
percent is rice, 4-5 percent jute, and 2.5
percent pulses. No other crop occupies
more than 2 percent of the area (Bangla-
desh, Bureau of Statistics, 1977).
11. The Ganges-Kobadak Irrigation
Project in Kushtia and Jessore districts,
under construction since the 195Os, is the
most notable. A major problem with
large-scale water control is that the
topography dictates that necessary stor-
age dams and canals would have to be
located outside Bangladesh, in India and
Nepal.
12. The Farakka Barrage, completed
in 1975, diverts water from the Ganges
through its Indian distributary, the
Hooghly, to Hush the port of Calcutta.
How much water will be diverted and
what effect this will have on Bangladesh
was an important point of contention
between Bangladesh and India before
an agreement was signed in 1977. The
dispute was referred to the United Na-
tions in 1976: Diversion of Ganges water
in the dry season of that year, according
to the Bangladesh government, "had un-
precedented ecological and economic con-
sequences.... Irrigation facilities, partic-
ularly by pumps and shallow and even
deep tubewells, have been hampered and
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pumps rendered inoperative. Some
400,000 acres of agricultural land have
been affected.... River navigation was dis-
rupted. Fishery, forestry and ｬ ｩ ｶ ･ ｾ ｴ ｯ ｣ ｫ re-
sources have been severely depleted. The
level of salinity has increased ... serious-
ly jeopardizing power and agricultural
production." (United Nations, 1976)
13. General accounts of the demog-
raphy of Bangladesh include A. Ahmed
( 1962) and M. R. Khan and A. R. Khan
( 1975). The earlier classic study of the
subcontinent by Davis (1951) is charac-
terized by a lack of detail on East Bengal.
14. From 1872 to 1921 population
grew at an average yearly rate of 0.76
percent, mostly through natural increase.
For comparison, the Indian growth rate
for 1871-1921 was 0.36 percent per year.
The higher rate recorded in Bangladesh
may reJlect census errors or more rapid
natural increase; net migration into the
region seems to have been neligible. See
Davis (1951), pp. 27, 109-111, and, on
migration specifically, M. R. Khan (1972b).
15. Death rates may have peaked to
50, 50, or more per thousand in times of
severe famine or epidemic (Davis, 1951,
chapter 5). The officially recorded death
rate for 1918, during the influenza epi-
demic, was 63 per thousand (Davis, p.
33 ). The most careful recent estimate
(19.4, for 1961-74) comes from the 1974
Retrospective Survey (UK Ministry of
Overseas Development, 1977). The official
death rate series is given in the Statistical
Pocket Book at Bang14desh 1978.
16. Improvements in transport and
communication in themselves probably
did as much to increase exports and facili-
tate speculation in food. supplies as to
even out price levels through interregional
trade. From the late nineteenth century,
however,.governmeDt laissez faire attitudes
toward famine were slowly replaced by
a more activist policy (relief works, sus-
pension of land revenue, and so on), so
that as Bhatia (1967), p. 270, puts it,
Famine was transformed into Food. Prob-
lem.
17. Robinson (1967), pp. 14-15,
and Davis (1951), chapter 5.
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18. Birth rates in the range of 45 to
50 per thousand are given by the 1962-65
Population Growth Estimation project, by
various other demographic surveys in the
1960s, and most recently by the 1974
Retrospective Survey, which estimated 48
per thousand. See M. R. Khan and A. R.
Khan (1975) and UK Ministry of Over-
seas Development (1977). An estimate of
42 is made by Sirageldin, Norris, and
Ahmad (1975), based on the 1968-69
National Impact Survey. (The discrepan-
cies are not a product of shifts in age dis-
tributions since they also show up in
estimates of total fertility.) See Potter
(1977) and Blacker (1977) for discus-
sions of some of the errors in these various
results. Note that if, as seems likely, fertil-
ity was low and infant mortality high in
the 1940s, birth rates may well have
dropped below their long-run average in
the late 1960s as the small 1940s cohort
passed through its peak reproductive
years.
19. In Partition it is estimated that
2.6 million Hindus emigrated from the
region while 700,000 Muslims immigrated.
During the 1971 war some 7 to 10 million
people (chiefly Hindus-probably over
half of Bangladesh's Hindu population)
fled to India, with perhaps a million of
them remaining in India after peace was
restored. There was also a much smaller
exodus of Hindus at the time of the 1965
Indo-Pakistan War. See M. R. Khan
(1972a, 1972b). Khan speculates that net
migration over the 1961-72 period could
have amounted to more than 2 million.
But even that number is only a tenth of
the actual population growth in Bangla-
desh in that period.
20. See N. Ahmad (1968), pp. 300-
303.
21. Caution is needed in tracing the
recent population growth differentials to
new activity in agriculture. The data are
not fully reliable (the 1974 census in
particular was taken under difficult cir-
cumstances ), and the convulsive migra-
tions of the early 1970s preclude any sim-
ple interpretation of growth rates.
22. On embankments and their im-
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pact and on the forest ecology, see N.
Ahmad (1968), p. 37 and chapter 7. Eco-
logical problems created by the new rice
technology include increased risk of crop
disease and pest damage with varietal
specialization, eutrofication from heavy
fertilizer use, harmful residues of pesti-
cides and weedicides, and the impact of
deep tubewells on the water table.
23. See Faaland and Parkinson
(1976), chapter 2. The Bureau of Statis-
tics index of real wages (1969-70 = 100)
fell steadily from 108 in the mid-1960s to
65 in the early 1970s (and to 49 in the
famine year 1974-75); in 1976-77 it had
risen to 71 (Statistical Pocket Book of
Bangladesh 1978).
24. Gustav Ranis (1974), p. 855, is
more hopeful than we on the prospects
for export processing zones, leading in
turn to decentralized labor-intensive in-
dustrial production for export: "It is by
no means unrealistic to expect Bangladesh
to ultimately become an important com-
petitor in this area, a field vacated by
Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong,
etc. whose wages are rising as a conse-
quence of the exhaustion of the labor sur-
plus."
25. The World Bank report is un-
published; its findings are referred to by
Faaland and Parkinson (1976), p. 132.
26. Area under high-yielding varie-
ties had reached only 15 percent of rice
cropped area by 1975-76 (Bangladesh,
Bureau of Statistics, 1977). Inputs have
recorded rapid increases, but from a very
small base. Data for the early 1970s show
more than 30,000 low-lift pumps in use,
a tenfold increase over a decade, and a
cumulative total of some 5,000 tubewells
(N. Ahmed, 1976, p. 25). Each pump or
well on average might irrigate 15 to 20
hectares. About 6.5 percent of cultivated
area is now irrigated by low-lift pumps,
1.2 percent by tubewells. Altogether, total
cropped area as a percentage of cultivated
area has grown from 127 percent in the
early 1960s to nearly ISO percent at pres-
ent. Fertilizer consumption (in terms of
nutrient value) quadrupled in the decade
1965-74 (Bangladesh, Bureau of Statis-
tics, 1977).
27. Access to land is defined more
precisely by effective landholding-that is,
land owned and cultivated, adjusted for
the amounts mortgaged and sharecropped
(in or out). See Wood (1976), p. 69.
Noncultivator occupations are still only
a small fraction of the rural labor force.
Fishing and livestock husbandry are typ-
ically secondary occupations within farm
or agricultural laborer families. Nonagri-
cultural occupations (chiefly commerce
and services) made up 17 percent of the
rural labor force in 1964, according to the
Master Survey of Agriculture of that year.
28. Data on the agricultural labor
force and distribution of holdings are
taken from Alamgir (1977), Table 6, and
the 1968 Master Survey of Agriculture.
The categorization of farm families is of
course highly schematic, ignoring the im-
portant considerations of family size, life-
cycle stage, local agricultural conditions,
and nonagricultural income, all of which
would influence the economic significance
of a particular size of landholding. Many
villages in the core areas of the country
have no holdings above 3 hectares; for
local purposes the "surplus" cutoff should
be lower.
29. Cultivated area grew by SO per-
cent in the first four decades of this cen-
tury, but has changed little since the
1940s. Average size of holding is con-
sidered to have diminished over the same
earlier period (N. Ahmad, 1968, pp. 184-
187,195). Cain (1977) estimates a sub-
sistence holding at 0.65 hectares for an
average household in an average year.
30. In fact, Table 2 suggests that
there has been some squeezing out of
small farms. There is also evidence of a
rising proportion of land operated by
tenants-from 18 percent of farm area in
1960 to 25 percent in 1974 (Alamgir,
1975, p. 269). On the actual procedures
of land transfers and their frequency by
size of holding, see Alamgir ( 1977), chap-
ter 4. Bertocci (1970), chapter 4, dis-
cusses the economics of land mortgaging
and foreclosure. Mead Cain (personal
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communication) notes that the process of
upward economic mobility, although less
common than its opposite, does occur:
Even originally landless agricultural
workers, by effort and luck, can sometimes
ascend the ladder.
31. The available data on landless-
ness do not constitute a consistent series.
The 1964 Master Survey of Agriculture
estimated the proportion at 14 percent of
the agricultural labor force, whereas the
SIDA/ILO Report a decade later recorded
more than double this proportion (Abdul-
lah, Hossain, and Nations, 1974). The
1951 and 1961 census estimates were 14
percent and 17 percent (Census of Pakis-
tan 1961, vol. 2); the 1977 Land Occu-
pancy Survey gives 27 percent (Statistical
Pocket Book of Bangladesh 1978, p. 121).
32. Based on the census labor force
data and a smoothed series of proportions
landless. For the male labor force con-
sidered alone, the 1961-74 growth would
have been about 4 million, with 3 to 3.5
million taken up by increasing landless-
ness.
33. Findings from the Dacca Uni-
versity Village Study Group (Adnan et al.,
1977 ).
34. In addition they may be able to
place one or more members in secure
nonagricultural occupations, as clerks,
teachers, and so on. See M. A. Huq
( 1976), chapters 4 and 7, for a discussion
of class differences in occupational diver-
sification among peasant families.
35. Cain (1977), pp. 206-207, de-
scribes the advantage to landholding fam-
ilies of providing most or all of their
cultivating labor themselves rather than
hiring workers: Family labor reduces the
often critical cash-Bow problems, especi-
ally at harvest time, and does nat need
the same supervision.
36. The growth of migrant agricul-
tural labor in Bangladesh is a particularly
important phenomenon. On its effect on
the local labor market see Wood (1976),
pp. 152-156.
37. The information on social orga-
nization presented here and assembled in
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Table 3 is an amalgam derived chieBy
from A. Islam (1974), Bertocci (1970),
and the working papers of the Dacca
University Village Study Group.
38. Normatively, a bari would com-
ｰ ｲ ｩ ｳ ｾ a man, his wife and sons, the wives
of married sons, grandchildren, unmarried
daughters, and perhaps widowed sisters.
A bari's land, however, may already have
been divided among its constituent house-
holds even before the death of the head,
and conBict among bari members, some·
times leading to litigation, is fairly
common.
39. See, for example, Dacca Univer-
sity Village Study Group (1975).
40. The gram or '10cal village," rele-
vant in discussing social organization,
does not always correspond to the mau%Q,
a revenue unit also called a village that
was set up in the nineteenth century, or
to the more recently defined "census vil-
lage" created for statistical purposes.
Bertocci (1976), p. 161, cites 1963 data
for the Kotwali thana (see note 47) of
Comilla district showing 463 gram (aver-
aging 340 persons). whereas there were
about 200 mauza and 250 census villages.
Investigations preceding the 1975 World
Fertility Survey, however, found frequent
coincidence between the administrative
and socially accepted units.
41. A. Islam (1974), p. 75. The re-
sidual identification, however, can be
important on occasions: ConBicts or feuds
between villages are not unknown.
42. See N. Ahmad (1956) for a re-
gion-by-region description of settlement
patterns in Bangladesh. Nucleated villages
are the rule in the moribund delta areas.
43. The diminishing importance of
kinship groups and shamai is discussed by
Abdullah, Hossain, and Nations (1976),
p. 217; Tepper (1976), p. 36; and Wood
(1976), pp. 147-149. On shifts in agri-
cultural arrangements with commerciali-
zation see Alamgir (1975).
44. Wood (1976), pp. 154-1M.
Many such people also end up among the
urban homeless: See Farouk (1976) for
a description of the process of extrusion
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from the countryside based on individual
case histories.
45. An elaborate investigation into
rural socioeconomic structures and change
in Bangladesh, now unde" way at thf'
Bangladesh Institute of Development
Studies, should substantially fill out our
information in this important area.
46. See in particular Adnan (1976)
and Dacca University Village Study
Group (1975).
47. Unions- have an average area of
about 35 km2• The next higher adminis-
trative unit, the thana, covers about 10
unions, with an average population of
160,000 and average area of 300 km2•
48. Sobhan (1968), pp. 77-88; Tep-
per (1970), p. 217; and A. Islam (1974).
Rahman (1962) gives a systematic ac-
count of the Basic Democracies scheme
of 1959, which set up the union councils
and similar committees at the thana and
higher administrative levels. Union coun-
cil members represent electoral wards,
which do not necessarily coincide with
any social unit-sometimes spanning sev-
eral villages, in other cases intersecting
them.
49. "[The well-off farmer1can invest
his surplus money without any risk or
labor by just loaning it to his neighbors
who are small farmers. Each year he gets
almost cent per cent return and his prin-
cipal still remains unpaid. If he saves
some paddy, he can loan it from harvest
to harvest and get back one and a half
maunds or more for one maund. So, when
this surplus farmer is told that he should
use better methods, better seeds or better
fertilizers for more production from his
land, he is not interested." (A. Abdullah,
1976, p. 89, quoting a Comilla report of
1963)
SO. The "Camilla experiment" and its
various progeny have an extensive litera-
ture. For assessments from various stand-
points see A. H. Khan (1971), Raper
(1970), and Abdullah, Hossain, and Na-
tions (1974).
51. On the Rural Public Works Pro-
gramme see Thomas (1968) and Sobhan
( 1968).
52. Abdullah, Hossain, and Nations
(1976) assess these possible conse-
ｾ ｵ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ ｳ Ｎ
53. Data from 1974 census. See
Miranda (1977). Two other urban areas
exceeded 100,000 population: Mymen-
singh and Rajshahi.
54. Alamgir (1973), p. 28.
55. On maniage ages see Census of
Pakistan 1961, vol. 2, p. 111-10 and Elahi
(1974), p. 5. The 1968-69 Impact Survey
estimated the median age at marriage of
a sample of married women under age 55
to be 13.2 years, with three-quarters mar-
ried before turning 14 and only 5 percent
still single by age 16 (Pakistan Population
Planning Council, n.d., p. 21). Higher
figures for the (singulate) mean age at
marriage are obtained in the 1974 Retro-
spective Survey: 16.5 years for women,
24.9 for men. See UK Ministry of Over-
seas Development (1977), p. 58, in which
evidence for recent increases is also dis-
cussed. See also note 71.
56. The 1974 Retrospective Survey
estimated total fertility at 7.1. See also
note 18.
57. See Cain ( 1977) for an empirical
study of the economic contribution of chil-
dren to a family.
58. The evidence on food availability
and nutrition is reviewed by Chen and
Chaudhury (1975). Alamgir (1974), p.
784, calculates that in the 1960s a pro-
portion fluctuating between 50 percent
and 70 percent of the population fell
below a "minimum" level of living corres-
ponding to a daily intake of 2,100 calories
and 58 gm protein. (On the trend in real
wages, see note 23.)
59. Information from L. C. Chen
( personal communication). Cause - of-
death data are collected as part of the
statistical program of the Cholera Re-
search Laboratory- in Matlab thana, but
have not yet been adequately analyzed.
See Curlin, Chen, and Hussain (1976),
Table 7 for the Matlab data as presently
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classified. National cause-of-death esti-
mates given by Robinson (1967), p. 31,
for about 1960 appear to substantially
overstate the present contribution of
malaria and maternal mortality, and to
understate diarrheal diseases.
60. A recent Cholera Research Labo-
ratory survey in a rural area on knowl-
edge of disease transmission found, for
example, that less than 5 percent of re-
spondents believed that spread of diar-
rhea and dysentery was related to polluted
water or' bad food (Cholera Research
Laboratory, 1977, p. 23). In 1969 it was
estimated that two-thirds of unions in
rural Bangladesh had no clinic or dispen-
sary; on average there was one doctor per
50,000 persons, one paramedical worker
per 5,000 (Awan, 1969, pp. 73-85). Much
health care is in the hands of homeopaths,
hakirns, and other traditional healers.
61. Cain (1978). As could be ex-
pected, infant mortality shows compara-
tively little class difference, since infants
are afforded fairly uniform nutritional and
immunological protection by breastfeed-
ing.
62. See Jahan (1975) for an over-
view of sex differentiaton in the labor-
force and occupational discrimination
faced by women. T. Abdullah (1974)
gives useful descriptive material on
women's place in society, their duties,
marriage, purdah, and so on. For a wide
bibliography on women in Bangladesh see
Germain (1977).
63. See Chen and Ghuznavi (n.d.)
and T. Abdullah and Zeidenstein (1977)
for interesting case material on the threat
of divorce and death of children and
husband. In the 1974 Retrospective Sur-
vey, the proportion of divorced among
ever-married women peaks at 3.5 percent
at ages 20 to 24, tailing off in later years.
64. The mortality regimes that under-
lie the average duration of marriage shown
in Figure 3 imply that in the present
decade about 17 percent of ever-married
women would be widowed by age 35 and
30 percent by age 45; in the 1930s the
corresponding proportions would have
been 33 percent and 50 percent.
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65. On this practice see, for example,
Bertocci (1970), p. 124.
66. T. Abdullah (1974).
67. Urban fertility is 7 percent lower
than rural; the greatest fertility differ-
ence among divisions is 5 percent (UK
Ministry of Overseas Development, 1977,
p. 79). Cain and DeVries-Baastiens
(1976), tables 5 and 6, assemble 1968-69
Impact Survey data indicating almost no
fertility differences between families with
"adequate" and "inadequate" living con-
ditions, or between families with and with-
out agricultural land. For similar findings
on landholding differentials see Aird
(1956), pp. 271-278, and Stoeckel and
Choudhury (1973), p. 123-the latter giv-
ing "desired" rather than attained family
size data. A small positive differential by
education at its lower levels is found in
the 1974 Retrospective Survey (UK Min-
istry of Overseas Development, 1977,
chapter 5). On urban middle-class fertility
see Duza (1974), pp. 69, 81, for some
relevant survey data.
68. Based on figures from the Matlab
registration area in Comilla district, the
only source of data on year-to-year vari-
ations. The crude birth rate averaged 44.8
per thousand over 1966-76, excluding
1972 and 1975; birth rates for the latter
two years were 41.8 and 27.6 (Cholera
Research Laboratory, 1977, Table 1).
69. The estimate of mean lactational
amenorrhea in Bangladesh is given by
Chen et aJ. (1974), p. 296. The fertility
impact is calculated using the formulas
and ceteris paribus assumptions of Bon-
gaarts (1978). If lactation dropped to
US levels, fertility could be raised 75
percent.
70. See Knodel (1977).
71. A more significant effect of poor
nutrition is to delay menarche. Recent
research suggests, however, that better
nutrition in Bangladesh would at most
raise fertility by around 5 percent. See
Bongaarts and Delgado (1977) and Mos-
ley (1977). It has been speculated that
the apparent recent increase in age at
marriage reflects the delayed menarche of
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girls who experienced the food crises of
the early 1970s, since onset of menarche
often triggers marriage (Cholera Research
Laboratory, 1977, p. 40).
72. Potentill1 fertility lost by death
of the wife by definition does not enter the
measure of total fertility, hence is not con-
sidered here.
73. Chen et aI. (1974), p. 296.
74. See Ahal ( 1967), p. 61, and UK
Ministry of Overseas Development (1974).
An earlier village demographic study by
Aird (1956), p. 157, concluded that be-
tween 96 and 98 percent of women are
initially capable of procreation.
75. Secondary sterility shows some
uniformity across different populations.
Henry's data for European populations
(perhaps a lower bound for Bangladesh)
average 3 percent of married women
sterile at age 20, 6 percent at age 25, 10
percent at age 30, 16 percent at age 35,
and 31 percent at age 40 (Henry, 1961,
p.85).
76. Sirageldin, Hossain, and Cain
(1975), p. 6. A slightly higher percentage
(6.4) had ever used contraception. In-
duced abortion is thought to be almost
nonexistent (Chen et al., 1974, p. 279).
77. Sirageldin, Hossain, and Cain
(1975), p. 24, conclude from analysis of
the Impact Survey: "Even if we take all
current use and expected future use, based
on reported intentions, this total expected
demand was and is not large enough to
generate the desired fertility reductions
in Bangladesh."
78. The experiment, begun in 1975,
covers a population of 125,000 with a
similar-sized control group. A user rate
of 10 percent might lead to a drop of
perhaps 5 points in the birth rate, say to
around 40 per thousand. It would be diffi-
cult, however, to replicate such a program
on a wide scale. See A. R. Khan and
Huber (1977) and Cholera Research
Laboratory (1977), pp. 36-J7.
79. Duza (1974), p. 82, cites data
from a 1974 survey of male villagers in
rural Chittagong: 86 percent of respond-
ents thought the country was now in
worse condition than in the past, and 80
percent considered their own condition to
be less happy than that of their fore-
fathers.
80. The argument is developed by
Cain (1978), who finds evidence of the
;'crisis management function" provided by
depth in the household labor force.
81. The term is Abu Abdullah's (per-
sonal communication).
82. Of ever-married women in their
40s in 1969, 13 percent had no living sons
(calculated from Impact Survey data).
The corresponding percentage for women
at this lowest economic level may well
exceed twice that figure.
83. From this description it might
seem that no increase in female marital
age could be expected. But forces that
would tend to raise this age can be de-
tected: lessening strength of the patriar-
chal family as assets are diluted (control
of a son's behavior is maintained by
promise of inheritance rather than filial
piety) and gradual raising of women's
status In the family.
84. Baldwin (1977) contrasts a pop-
ulation projection assuming constant mor-
tality and fertility at current levels with
one in which there are an additional
500,000 disaster fatalities annually, and
shows that the population attained by the
year 2000 In the former case ( 156 million)
is reached only six years later in the latter
case.
85. India's industrial production
averaged 6.1 percent annual growth over
1951-73 (Veit, 1976, p. 75).
86. The index of industrial produc-
tion in Bangladesh on a base 1970 = 100
has recorded the following recent changes:
1974, 90; 1975, 81; 1976, 87; 1977, ff1
(Statistical Pocket Book uf Banglodesh
1978, p. 178).
87. In a recent survey of union COUD-
cil members, M. Rashiduzzaman (personal
communication) found evidence of a
"new" elite beginning to emerge in addi-
tion to the landed gentry-professional
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people, local contractors, and other small
businessmen.
88. Based on Matlab data given by
Chaudhury and Curlin (1975) and Mir-
anda (1977), on average in a village of
500 people, perhaps 5 persons a year
would move to a town and 2 or 3 return.
The Ｑ Ｙ Ｖ Ｘ ｾ Ｙ National Impact Survey
found that 25 percent of married women
villagers had ever visited a town, and 15
percent had done so in the past 12 months
(Pakistan Population Planning Council,
n.d., p. 36). The fli\1res for men would,
of course, be greater.
89. See Bangladesh Rural Advance-
ment Committee (1976) and Chen and
Ghuznavi (n.d. ).
90. Using Cain's data (1977), this
would happen if rural wages fell by 30
percent.
91. For an account of family plan-
ning program activities see Bangladesh,
Population and Nutrition Projects Depart-
ment (1975). A broad criticism of the pro-
gram is contained in Demeny (1975).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
75
92. See, for example, M. Ahmed
(1977a, 1977b) and Haque et al. (1977).
The latter gives a brief report on the so-
called Rangpur Self-reliant Movement,
which achieved remarkable and widely
publicized results in organizing peasants
for a variety of development objectives
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scription and skeptical assessment.
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p.12.
95. Signs of interest in this general
policy approach include the discussion of
"compulsory cooperatives" in the last
months of the Mujib administration, and
the still-deTeloping SWaWrvar movement,
mentioned earlier.
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